| R&D合作中知识窃取和知识保护的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 刁丽琳,朱桂龙,许治.R&D合作中知识窃取和知识保护的博弈分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2012,33(4):80-88. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刁丽琳 朱桂龙 许治 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州510641／华南农业大学经济管理学院,广州510642
2. 华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州,510641 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目“以产业技术为导向的产学研联盟组织模式与治理机制研究”(70973038)、“区域创新资源约束下嵌入式产业创新系统再造研究”(71073057);国家社科基金项目“供应链核心企业主导的农产品质量安全管理研究”(11CGL059);教育部人文社科青年基金项目“研发联盟合作中的知识泄漏风险与知识保护研究”(10YJC630042) |
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| 摘 要： | 知识产权保护一直是R＆D合作中的热点问题。在综合考虑知识的共享比例和非正常溢出率、知识保护成本、知识窃取成功率以及社会惩罚等因素的基础上,构建了一个R＆D合作组织间知识窃取和保护的博弈模型,分析其均衡实现条件及其影响因素。研究表明,R＆D合作组织的知识保护和知识窃取具有内在联动机制,企业的知识保护概率受知识保护成本、非正常知识溢出比率和对方知识窃取成功率等因素的影响,而合作伙伴的知识窃取概率取决于非正常知识溢出收益、社会惩罚和知识窃取成功率。针对上述结论,以一个数值算例加以说明,最后提出了相应的管理启示。
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| 关 键 词： | R＆D合作 知识窃取 知识保护 博弈论 |
The Game Theoretical Analysis on Knowledge Appropriation and Knowledge Protection in R＆D Cooperation |
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| DIAO Lilin,ZHU Guilong,XU Zhi.The Game Theoretical Analysis on Knowledge Appropriation and Knowledge Protection in R＆D Cooperation[J].Science of Science and Management of S.& T.,2012,33(4):80-88. |
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| Authors: | DIAO Lilin ZHU Guilong XU Zhi |
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| Institution: | 1(1.School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China;2.School of Economics and Management,South China Agricultural University,Guangzhou 510642,China) |
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| Abstract: | Intellectual right protection has been a hot topic in R&D cooperation for long.From the perspective of game theory,the article models knowledge appropriation and protection in R&D alliances by considering such factors as knowledge sharing ratio,the rate of unexpected knowledge spillover,the cost of knowledge protection,the rate of successful knowledge appropriation and social punishment,followed by the analysis on the equilibrium of the model.The result indicates that knowledge appropriation and knowledge protection in R&D alliances are correlated.The probability of firm’s knowledge protection is influenced by protection cost,the rate of unexpected knowledge spillover and the rate of successful knowledge appropriation,while the probability of partner’s knowledge appropriation depends on the profit of unexpected knowledge spillover,the rate of successful knowledge appropriation and social punishment.In order to demonstrate the above points,an example is further illustrated.In the end,management implications are drawn based on the conclusions. |
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| Keywords: | R&D cooperation knowledge appropriation knowledge protection Game theory |
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