Nonadmirable moral exemplars and virtue development |
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| Authors: | Koji Tachibana |
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| Institution: | 1. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Kumamoto University, Kumamoto, Japankoji-t@kumamoto-u.ac.jp https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5203-7081 |
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| Abstract: | ABSTRACTLinda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory claims that admiration for a person is a necessary condition for her to be a moral exemplar. I argue that this claim is empirically unsupported. I provide two counterexamples, astronauts and brain data. I demonstrate that they play the role of exemplars well but receive no admiration and, accordingly, are entitled to be called nonadmirable moral exemplars. I conclude that my argument suggests why Aristotle, distinct from Zagzebski, does not emphasise the role of the praiseworthiness of virtue in his theory of virtue development in the Nicomachean Ethics. |
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| Keywords: | admiration imitation astronaut neurofeedback moral education Aristotle |
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https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5203-7081