| 机构投资者参与公司治理的传导途径研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 卢晖,肖婧,张伟.机构投资者参与公司治理的传导途径研究[J].北京师范大学学报(社会科学版),2012(3):115-125. |
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| 作者姓名： | 卢晖 肖婧 张伟 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北财经大学经济学院,大连,116025;新疆维吾尔自治区中医医院,乌鲁木齐,830012;新疆财经大学会计学院,乌鲁木齐,830012 |
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| 摘 要： | 机构投资者制度是英美等发达国家重要的公司治理机制之一,机构投资者积极主动地监督公司经营管理缓解了公司治理中的代理问题。在本世纪初,中国证监会也提出了大力发展机构投资者的思路。然而,已有制度引进的经验教训表明,中国上市公司的治理问题与西方发达国家是不同的,有两个重要问题必须予以回答:在西方发达国家制度背景下建立起来的机构投资者制度,在中国是否能有效发挥作用?基于中国的特殊制度背景,机构投资者制度成功的条件和机制是什么?利用中国上市公司数据,采用结构方程模型对机构投资者参与公司治理的传导途径进行的实证分析表明,中国的机构投资者参与公司治理不能直接促进公司业绩,而是通过抑制上市公司的控股股东掏空行为,间接地提升公司业绩。上市公司投资者保护执行行为在此发挥了中介作用,有效地约束了上市公司控股股东的掏空行为。但是,机构投资者对高管层过度的在职消费和薪酬操纵等代理行为不能发挥治理作用。其政策含义是,加强投资者保护执行力度以及完善机构投资者本身的治理机制,有利于上市公司治理的改善。
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| 关 键 词： | 机构投资者 公司治理 投资者保护 传导途径 |
Transmission Channels of Institutional Investors Participating in Corporate Governance |
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| LU Hui
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XIAO Jing
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ZHANG Wei.Transmission Channels of Institutional Investors Participating in Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Science Edition),2012(3):115-125. |
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| Authors: | LU Hui XIAO Jing ZHANG Wei |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Economics,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025;2.Xinjiang Hospital of Traditional Chinese Medical,Urumqi 830012;3.School of Accounting,Xinjiang University of Finance & Economics,Urumqi 830012,China) |
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| Abstract: | Using the SEM model and the data of the listed companies in China stock market,we study the transmission channels of institutional investors who participate in corporate governance.We find that institutional investors participating in corporate governance cannot contribute directly to company performance,but indirectly enhance it through constraining the controlling shareholder’s tunneling.Furthermore,that the result suggests the enforcement of investor protection in the listed companies is the mediator between institutional investors participating in corporate governance and company performance,and it can effectively constrain the controlling shareholder’s tunneling.However,institutional investors have no significant influences on non-pecuniary compensation and monetary compensation manipulation.It is then necessary to enhance enforcement of investor protection and perfect institutional investors’ institution in favor of improving corporate governance. |
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| Keywords: | institutional investors investor protection corporate governance transmission channel |
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