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抽检制度与企业劣质产品生产行为的关系研究
引用本文:陶新,孙绍荣.抽检制度与企业劣质产品生产行为的关系研究[J].技术与创新管理,2012,33(1):61-64,76.
作者姓名:陶新  孙绍荣
作者单位:上海理工大学管理学院,上海杨浦,200093
基金项目:国家自然科学基金,上海市重点学科,上海市教委科研创新重点项目
摘    要:文章针对我国抽检制度在实施的过程中仍然存在很多生产劣质产品的企业,这种现状严重损害了消费者的合法权益、破坏了国家的安定、在国际方面损害了国家形象.从博弈论的研究视角出发,对企业的行为选择进行分析并提出治理和引导对策,即政府部门不仅要从法律的角度加大企业生产劣质品的惩罚力度,还要从经济的角度对企业进行引导以及从降低质检工作的成本出发,制定合理的奖惩制度来激励质检部门的工作等对企业进行治理和引导.

关 键 词:抽检制度  混合博弈  纳什均衡  治理对策

Relationship of the Random Inspection System and Manufacturing of Inferior Quality Products
TAO Xin , SUN Shao-rong.Relationship of the Random Inspection System and Manufacturing of Inferior Quality Products[J].Technology and Innovation Management,2012,33(1):61-64,76.
Authors:TAO Xin  SUN Shao-rong
Institution:(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)
Abstract:Nowadays random inspection system has been put into effect,but there are still a lot of companies producing inferior quality products.Those products seriously harm the consumers’ legal rights and benefits,harm their physical and mental health,and even break our social stability.Internationally,China’s reputation and benefits are both impaired.Chinese government should not only increase the level of legal sanction of those companies that produce inferior quality products,but also provide proper guide for enterprises.Besides,reasonable system for reward and punishment should be established to encourage the quality control department.This can start with decreasing the cost of quality control.
Keywords:random inspection system  mixed game  nash equilibrium  countermeasure
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