| 我国公共资源类旅游景区悲剧的博弈论探讨——从使用者角度剖析 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄金火,陈秀琼.我国公共资源类旅游景区悲剧的博弈论探讨——从使用者角度剖析[J].资源科学,2005,27(5):180-186. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄金火 陈秀琼 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 莆田学院,莆田,351100;北京大学旅游研究与规划中心,北京,100871
2. 莆田学院,莆田,351100;厦门大学,厦门,361005 |
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| 基金项目： | 福建省社会科学基金，福建省教育厅社会科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 鉴于公共资源类旅游景区的社会公益性,世界上绝大多数国家更看重的其社会文化教育福利等多方面的非经济功能,普遍采取免收门票和低门票的做法.而我国最近却引发世界遗产地和国家级风景名胜区涨价的多米诺骨牌效应,人们呼吁国家对全部公共资源类景区实行免费开放或低门票,真正实现资源的公共性质.本文从旅游者角度对我国公共资源类旅游景区资源过度使用问题进行博弈论分析,深入阐述旅游者之间的博弈策略,对旅游者的不当行为进行解释.本文认为我国要对公共资源类旅游景区进行免费开放实行公共权利是有一定困难的,要实现正和博弈是很难的,如不加以有效约束,最终会酿造"公共悲剧".所以,目前国内大部分民众和学者呼吁我国应与国际接轨,要求公共资源类旅游景区不售门票,实行免费开放,为时过早,不值得提倡.
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈论 公共资源类旅游景区 公地悲剧 公共权力 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-7588（2005）05-0180-07 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-01-24 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年1月24日 |
Analyzing the Tragedy of Common Pool Tourism Resources in China Through Game Theory |
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| HUANG Jin-huo,CHEN Xiu-qiong.Analyzing the Tragedy of Common Pool Tourism Resources in China Through Game Theory[J].Resources Science,2005,27(5):180-186. |
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| Authors: | HUANG Jin-huo CHEN Xiu-qiong |
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| Abstract: | Owing to the commonweal characteristic of common tourism resources, most countries emphasize its non-economical values, such as society value, culture value, science and education value and social welfare value, and thus adopt the free-charge or low-price policy. However, the Domino effect of ticket prices appreciation recently was brought about in World Heritages site and National Parks of China. Chinese common attractions seem to prefer their economic value to non-economic values. So people appeal to government for free-charge or low-price policy in order to realize the commonweal characteristic of common tourism resources and achieve their public right-tourism right. However, from tourist opinion, the paper analyzes the overuse problems arose from free-ticket of common tourism resources through game theory and further identifies their game strategies, hopefully providing a good explanation to tourists' misbehavior. It is concluded that it is difficult for common tourism resource attractions to carry out free-charge policy and achieve Positive game as well. Without effective regulation and perfect law system, the overuse of common tourism resources would bring about Common Tragedy. Therefore the prevailing free-charge or low-price policy in other countries is not suitable for China at the present time, especially for those rare and vulnerable tourism resources. |
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| Keywords: | The game theory Common tourism attractions The common tragedy Public right |
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