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基于演化博弈分析的产业共性技术开发研究
引用本文:徐涵蕾,梁植军.基于演化博弈分析的产业共性技术开发研究[J].科技管理研究,2016(10):129-136.
作者姓名:徐涵蕾  梁植军
作者单位:1. 哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨 150001;哈尔滨工程大学企业创新研究所,黑龙江哈尔滨 150001;2. 哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨,150001;3. 中国建设银行黑龙江分行,哈尔滨,150001
基金项目:国家软科学计划项目“我国中小企业知识转移影响因素与对策”(2012GXS4D114),国家社会科学基金重点项目“区域创新系统中科研院所作用机理与管理政策研究”(14AGL004),中央高校基础研究项目“动态能力视角下制造业企业创新能力的形成机理及对成长绩效影响的研究”(HEUCF150905)
摘    要:基于演化博弈分析模型,探讨产业共性技术开发过程中各类主体面临市场失灵时的行为选择,分析影响产业共性技术开发行为的因素,提出政府在产业共性技术开发"市场失灵"的不同程度下应该适当地干预产业共性技术开发。政府通过构建产业共性技术的评价体系,根据产业共性技术"外部性程度"分别采取基金资助,设立非政府的专门组织如国家研究所(院)和促进合作研究所,搭建克服"组织失灵"的企业与高校合作平台等方式,借以促进我国产业共性技术的发展。

关 键 词:产业共性技术  外部性  市场失灵  演化博弈
收稿时间:2015/8/31 0:00:00
修稿时间:2015/10/3 0:00:00

Research on the Development of Industry Generic Technology based on Evolutionary Game Theory
Abstract:Industrial generic technology development is an important driving force for the development of our country industry. However, at present, China"s industrial generic technology development face varying degrees of externality and market failure "problems problems, in this paper, based on evolutionary game analysis model of industrial generic technology development process all the subject facing market failure behavior choice, factor analysis of the influence of industrial generic technology development of proposed government should be under the" market failure "of industrial generic technology development of different degree of different degree of intervention of industrial generic technology development. Government, through the construction of evaluation system of industrial generic technology decision of industrial generic technology "external" were taken to the fund, the establishment of non-government organization dedicated; National Research Institute and promote research cooperation, strengthen the cooperation between enterprise and University platform built to overcome "Organizational Failure", etc., in order to promote the development of our country"s industrial generic technology.
Keywords:industry generic technology  externality  market failure  evolution game
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