| PPP模式运营期内公私部门合作机制的演化分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱建波,时茜茜,盛昭瀚.PPP模式运营期内公私部门合作机制的演化分析[J].科技管理研究,2016(24):218-224. |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱建波 时茜茜 盛昭瀚 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京,210093 |
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| 基金项目： | 江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目，国家自然科学基金资助重大项目，国家自然科学基金资助项目，国家自然科学基金资助项目，江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目，国家自然科学基金资助项目，国家自然科学基金资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 为研究PPP模式下项目运营期内的公私合作问题,以有限理性为前提基于演化视角建立双方的博弈模型,探讨演化稳定策略的影响因素。研究结果表明,政府部门应关注收益分配的平衡对于合作的影响,避免补贴机制失效;在一定情形下,私人部门成本的降低、超额收益的增加、政府监管成本的上升均可使双方走向合作,超额收益存在一个最优分配系数,可促成双方达成良好的协同关系;合理的惩罚机制的设置,也可以促进双方的合作。
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| 关 键 词： | PPP模式 合作机制 收益分配 运营期 |
| 收稿时间： | 2016/3/25 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2016/4/16 0:00:00 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Coordination Mechanism for Operation Period in Public-private Partnerships Projects |
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| Abstract: | For the study of public-private cooperation mechanism in operation period of PPP projects,given the bounded rationality of government and the private sector,a public-private cooperation evolution model was established.By using this model,the mechanism of interaction between them,income distribution,incentive and supervision,cooperation cost and other factors affecting the evolution stability of the system were analyzed.The results show that the government should balance the excess income distribution to avoid the failure of supervision and incentive mechanism;the decrease of private cost and increase of excess income and supervision cost have a positive correlation with the cooperation of both sides;there is an optimal proportion of excess income allocation,which makes a win-win co-operation of both sides;a reasonable punishment mechanism can also promote bilateral cooperation. |
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| Keywords: | PPP model coordination mechanism income distribution operation period |
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