| 政府管制下建筑节能服务公司与业主策略行为的进化博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 赵倩倩.政府管制下建筑节能服务公司与业主策略行为的进化博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2016(9):198-203. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 赵倩倩 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 天津城建大学经济与管理学院,天津,300384 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，住房和城乡建设部软科学研究计划项目 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 建筑节能服务产业是推动我国既有建筑节能改造工作的重要组成部分,然而目前建筑节能服务质量有待提高和市场需求不足阻碍了建筑节能服务公司(Energy Service Company,简称ESCO)的发展。运用进化博弈理论,建立无政府奖励和有政府奖励条件下参与节能改造的ESCO与业主复制动态模型,分析其行为的动态演变过程,探讨其博弈结果的稳定性。研究得出结论:政府前期激励政策可促进节能服务主体积极参与到节能服务市场中;后期主要通过合适的奖励额度引导市场主体提高节能服务质量,为市场健康有序发展提供保障。最后提出促进建筑节能服务公司发展的措施。
|
| 关 键 词： | 政府管制 ESCO 业主 行为策略 进化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2015/6/22 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2016/4/14 0:00:00 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Strategic Behavior of ESCO and Owner under Government Regulation |
| |
| Abstract: | Building energy service industry is an important part which promotes energy-efficiency renovation for existing buildings, but the current low quality of energy-efficiency service and serious shortage of demand hinder the development of ESCO who engages in energy efficiency service. Using evolutionary game theory, the paper establishes replicator dynamics model of ESCO and owner who participate in energy saving without government rewards and with government rewards, analyzes dynamic evolution of their behavior, and investigates the stability of the game results. The following conclusions can be drawn: the former incentives can promote energy-saving service bodies to actively participate in the energy-saving service market, the latter appropriate award can guide market players to improve quality of energy-saving service, in order to provide protection for healthy and orderly development for the market. At last, it is concluded on how to promote the development of ESCO. |
| |
| Keywords: | government regulation ESCO owner behavior strategy evolutionary game |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《科技管理研究》浏览原始摘要信息 |
| 点击此处可从《科技管理研究》下载免费的PDF全文 |
|
