| 网络信息资源著作权风险规避中的委托代理关系 |
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| 引用本文： | 李婵,徐龙顺,张文德.网络信息资源著作权风险规避中的委托代理关系[J].图书情报工作,2017,61(22):45-51. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李婵 徐龙顺 张文德 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 福建农林大学公共管理学院 福州 350002;
2. 福州大学信息管理研究所/信息化建设办公室 福州 350116 |
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| 基金项目： | 本文系福建省社会科学青年项目"网络信息资源著作权侵权风险动态监测及动态决策研究"（项目编号：FJ2016C094）研究成果之一。 |
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| 摘 要： | 目的/意义]通过对网络信息资源著作权风险中著作权人与网络服务提供者的博弈分析，在利益均衡的基础上提出著作权风险规避的策略。方法/过程]运用委托代理理论的基本原理，分析著作权人与网络服务提供者的委托代理关系，构建信息不对称条件下著作权人为风险中性和风险规避时的委托代理模型，并进一步对两种情况下的各绩效指标进行探讨。结果/结论]在委托代理机制下，著作权人与网络服务提供者在风险规避上的利益具有一致性；在两种不同情况下著作权人的激励程度、网络服务提供者的努力程度以及总的期望收益均有显著变化；著作权人的激励程度以及双方的最终收益与网络服务提供者的努力程度、努力成效、风险规避程度、项目完成能力等因素密切相关。基于此，可以通过健全奖惩激励机制、完善利益补偿机制、强化监督管理机制来规避网络信息资源著作权中的风险问题，实现委托代理双方收益的帕累托最优。
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| 关 键 词： | 网络信息资源著作权 著作权人 网络服务提供者 委托代理 风险规避 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017-05-16 |
Principal-agent Relationships in Copyright Risk Avoidance of Network Information Resources |
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| Li Chan,Xu Longshun,Zhang Wende.Principal-agent Relationships in Copyright Risk Avoidance of Network Information Resources[J].Library and Information Service,2017,61(22):45-51. |
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| Authors: | Li Chan Xu Longshun Zhang Wende |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Public Administration, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002;
2. Institute of Information Management/Information Construction Office, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116 |
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| Abstract: | Purpose/significance] This article proposes some effective strategies on avoiding the copyright risks by way of analyzing game relationship between the copyright holders and network service providers.Method/process] It uses the Principal-agent Theory to analyze the principal-agent relationship between copyright holders and network service providers. Then it builds a Risk-Neutral model and a Risk-Evasive model in the case of information asymmetry, and further researches the Performance Indicators in different situations.Result/conclusion] The results show that the interests of copyright holder are consistent with those network service providers. In different conditions, the incentive degree of copyright holders and the struggling degree of network service providers and the total expected revenue change significantly. Furthermore, the incentive degree of copyright holders and the final interests of both are closely related to the factors of network service providers' struggling degree and efforts and so on. Therefore, the copyright risks can be avoided by the following suggestions:(i) improve the rewards and punishment incentive mechanism; (ii) perfect the benefit compensation mechanism; (iii) strengthen supervision and management mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | copyright of network information resources copyright holders network service providers principal-agent risk aversion |
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