| 基于博弈论的绩效考核中棘轮效应研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈三艳,袁乐平.基于博弈论的绩效考核中棘轮效应研究[J].荆州师范学院学报,2008(5):84-86. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈三艳 袁乐平 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083 |
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| 摘 要： | 借助多重动态博弈分析绩效工资的计量，得出代理人绩效考核中棘轮效应存在的必然性，在委托合同延续的时间足够长的前提下，绩效考核的标准就趋于当前的绩效水平，也就是绩效工资为零。
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| 关 键 词： | 棘轮效应 多重动态博弈 绩效考核 委托代理 |
An Analysis of the Ratchet Effect in Performance Appraisal Based on Game Theory |
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| CHEN San-yan,YUAN Le-ping.An Analysis of the Ratchet Effect in Performance Appraisal Based on Game Theory[J].Journal of Jingzhou Teachers College,2008(5):84-86. |
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| Authors: | CHEN San-yan YUAN Le-ping |
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| Institution: | (Business School, Central South University, Changsha Hunan 410083) |
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| Abstract: | By analysing the measurement of performance wages with the multiple dynamic gambling, we can get the conclusion that the ratchet effect exists inevitability. If the contract of principal-agent lasts enough long time, the performance appraisal＇s standard approaches the current performance level, and the performance wages is zero. |
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| Keywords: | ratchet effect multiple dynamic gambling performance appraisal principal-agent |
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