| 回报率规制中道德风险问题的模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王燕,李文兴.回报率规制中道德风险问题的模型研究[J].中国软科学,2006(5):142-148. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王燕 李文兴 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京交通大学,经济管理学院,北京,100044 |
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| 摘 要： | 政府在规制自然垄断企业的过程中,由于二者之间的信息不对称,规制合约往往是不完备的。如目前我国普遍采用的回报率规制,就存在明显的道德风险问题。本文运用委托-代理理论和机制设计方法,针对这一缺陷进行模型分析,并尝试提出克服企业机会主义行为的改进方案,为我国自然垄断行业的规制改革提供参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 自然垄断行业 回报率规制 道德风险 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-9753(2006)05-0142-07 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-03-10 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-04-25 |
Study on the Model of Moral Hazard in the ROR Regulation |
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| WANG Yan,LI Wen-xing.Study on the Model of Moral Hazard in the ROR Regulation[J].China Soft Science,2006(5):142-148. |
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| Authors: | WANG Yan LI Wen-xing |
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| Institution: | Academy of Economics and Management, Belting Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China |
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| Abstract: | In the regulatory process, the contracts are often imperfect because of the asymmetric information between the government and the regulated natural monopoly firms. For example, there is an obvious problem of moral hazard in ROR regulation which has been adopted widely by our government now. The paper will use principal - agent theory and mech- anism design methods to do some model analyses for this flaw, and try to put forward incentive schemes in order to restrain the opportunistic behavior for the regulated firms. It will also offer some referrenccs for the regulatory reform in the natural monopoly industries of our country. |
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| Keywords: | natural monopoly industries ROR(rate of return) regulation moral hazard incentive mechanism |
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