| 基于道德风险的独立学院教师激励契约设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 李国志,侯英梅,陈明伟.基于道德风险的独立学院教师激励契约设计[J].成都教育学院学报,2009,23(8):75-77. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李国志 侯英梅 陈明伟 |
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| 作者单位： | 江西农业大学南昌商学院,江西南昌,330013 |
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| 基金项目： | 江西省教育厅高等学校教学改革研究课题"独立学院教学管理的人性化研究" |
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| 摘 要： | 在独立学院与教师之间的委托代理关系中，教师由于拥有信息优势，为了自身利益最大化，往往做出有损院方利益的事情，因此院方必须设计某种契约，引导教师发挥最优的努力水平。在非对称信息下，当教研成果为高水平时，教师获得了比完全信息下更多的收益；当教研成果为低水平时，教师则获得了比完全信息下更少的收益。由于道德风险存在和风险回避特性，教师的努力水平是向下扭曲的，因此院方要激励教师付出高水平的努力比在完全信息下更加困难。
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| 关 键 词： | 独立学院 教师 非对称信息 道德风险 激励契约 |
Incentive Contract Design about Independent College Teachers Based on Moral Hazard |
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| Institution: | LI Guo- zhi HOU Ying- mei CHEN Ming- wei (Jiangxi Agriculture University, Nanchang Business School, Nanchang, 330013, China) |
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| Abstract: | In the agent relationship between Independent College and a teacher, the teacher often does something harm to Independent College for his own interests and with the information superiority. So Independent College has to design a kind of contract to guide the teacher to make great efforts. The study shows that, an efficient teacher will obtain more utility under asymmetric information than full information, but an inefficient teacher will be opposite. At the same time,due to the moral hazard and risk avoidance,tire teacher will lower the effort level, so it will be more difficult for Independent College to encourage the teacher to make ldgh level effort. |
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| Keywords: | Independent College teacher asymmetric information moral hazard incentive contract |
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