| 中央政府、地方政府、企业关于环境污染的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张春英.中央政府、地方政府、企业关于环境污染的博弈分析[J].辽宁科技学院学报,2008,10(4):47-49. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张春英 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉理工大学经济学院,湖北,武汉,430070 |
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| 摘 要： | 改革开放以来，中央政府多次要求加强环境保护，但是部分地方政府仍然纵容企业的环境污染。本文分析了地方政府与企业合谋的形成条件，进而构建中央政府、地方政府、企业的博弈模型，指出影响中央政府监管、地方政府与企业合谋的变量，力图为构建合理、有效的监管机制提供相关建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 环境污染 政府 企业 |
A Discussion on the Game between the Central Government,Local Government and enterprises at environment Pollution |
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| ZHANG Chun-ying.A Discussion on the Game between the Central Government,Local Government and enterprises at environment Pollution[J].Journal of Liaoning Institute of Science and Technology,2008,10(4):47-49. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Chun-ying |
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| Institution: | ZHANG Chun-ying(School of Economy,Wuhan University of Science , Engineering,Wuhan,Hubei,430070,China0 |
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| Abstract: | Since carried out the policy of reform and open up,our central government repeatedly demanded to improve the environment protection,but some local government still connived enterprises at environment pollution.The paper analyses the condition of connivance of local government with enterprises,further establish a game model between the central government,local government and enterprises,presents the variable which affected the supervision from central government and connivance of local governments with enter... |
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| Keywords: | Environment pollution Government Enterprise |
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