| 群体性突发事件产生根源的主观博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 徐寅峰,刘德海.群体性突发事件产生根源的主观博弈分析[J].预测,2004,23(6):43-45,9. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 徐寅峰 刘德海 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学,管理学院,陕西,西安,710049 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金优秀创新群体资助项目(70121001) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文运用主观博弈模型分析了我国群体性突发事件的产生根源。社会弱势群体考虑对收入差距敏感程度这一私人信息后，其行动策略集合发生变化，运用前向归纳法对弱势群体采取非子博弈纳什均衡的斗争策略具体条件进行了分析。结果表明，群体性突发事件的产生条件取决于弱势群体对博弈收益差距敏感程度、自身收益的变化率和现存社会体制下各社会阶层采取不同策略的预期收益等因素。
|
| 关 键 词： | 群体性突发事件 主观博弈 弱势群体 前向归纳法 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5192(2004)06-0043-03 |
The Subjective Game Analysis for the Root of Mass Unexpected Incident |
| |
| XU Yin-feng,LIU De-hai.The Subjective Game Analysis for the Root of Mass Unexpected Incident[J].Forecasting,2004,23(6):43-45,9. |
| |
| Authors: | XU Yin-feng LIU De-hai |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the root of mass unexpected incident used subjective game theory. After the social weakly population considers the private information that's sensitive degree for payoff disparity, the strategies set will change. It uses the forward induction to analyze the condition that the social weakly population takes the non-rational battle strategy departure from sub-game perfect equilibrium, that are decided by sensitive degree for income disparity, income rise rate and different expected incomes that social estates take the different strategies under the current system. |
| |
| Keywords: | mass unexpected incident subjective game social weakly population forward induction |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
