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政府-企业间质量监管博弈分析
引用本文:朱立龙,于涛,夏同水.政府-企业间质量监管博弈分析[J].软科学,2013,27(1):47-49,68.
作者姓名:朱立龙  于涛  夏同水
作者单位:1. 山东师范大学商学院,济南250014;伊利诺伊大学香槟分校商学院,美国伊利诺伊州61820
2. 山东师范大学商学院,济南,250014
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究项目,国家自然科学基金重大项目
摘    要:通过对博弈模型中纯战略Nash均衡、占优战略Nash均衡和混合战略Nash均衡的分析,揭示了政府质量监管部门与生产企业建立质量管理体系监管博弈的内部运行机理。为实践中政府如何有效进行质量监管以及生产企业如何有效提高产品质量水平提出了建议,并为该监管博弈模型在实践中的具体应用指明了方向。

关 键 词:质量管理体系  监管  博弈  Nash均衡

Quality Supervision Game Analysis between Government and Manufacturing Enterprise
ZHU Li-long , YU Tao , XIA Tong-shui.Quality Supervision Game Analysis between Government and Manufacturing Enterprise[J].Soft Science,2013,27(1):47-49,68.
Authors:ZHU Li-long  YU Tao  XIA Tong-shui
Institution:1(1.School of Business,Shandong Normal University,Ji’nan 250014; 2.School of Business,University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,Illinois,USA 61820)
Abstract:This paper establishes the supervision game model between government department and manufacturing enterprises who establish a quality management system.Through analyzing the game model of pure strategy Nash equilibrium,dominant strategy Nash equilibrium and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,it reveals the supervision game internal operational mechanism between the government quality supervision department and manufacturing enterprise.it provide many suggestions for the government how to supervise effectively and manufacturing enterprise how to improve products quality level,meanwhile it point out the direction for the model to apply in the practice.
Keywords:quality management system  supervision  game theory  Nash equilibrium
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