| 风险厌恶下合作研发的双边激励合同 |
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| 引用本文： | 代建生,田惠文,秦开大.风险厌恶下合作研发的双边激励合同[J].软科学,2017(3):63-67. |
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| 作者姓名： | 代建生 田惠文 秦开大 |
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| 作者单位： | 昆明理工大学 管理与经济学院,昆明,650093 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(71462023、71362025)，云南省应用基础研究计划面上项目(2016FB114)，云南高校新型智库建设项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过构建基于纳什谈判的团队生产模型,在风险厌恶下考察合作研发的双边激励和谈判问题.分析研发组织的研发效率、风险厌恶以及产出波动等因素对线性激励合同的影响,研究表明:一方所得最优线性分享比例随自身(对方)研发效率的上升而增大(下降),随自身(对方)风险厌恶程度的上升而减小(增大);而最优线性分享比例随研发产出方差的变化依赖于两个组织的风险厌恶程度与研发效率乘积的相对大小;最后剖析了风险厌恶、谈判能力、研发效率和产出波动等因素对激励合同及研发产出的影响机理.
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| 关 键 词： | 合作研发 双边激励合同 风险厌恶 纳什谈判 |
Bilateral Incentive Contract of the Cooperative R&D with Risk Aversion |
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| DAI Jian-sheng,TIAN Hui-wen,QIN Kai-da.Bilateral Incentive Contract of the Cooperative R&D with Risk Aversion[J].Soft Science,2017(3):63-67. |
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| Authors: | DAI Jian-sheng TIAN Hui-wen QIN Kai-da |
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| Abstract: | To construct a team production model on collaborative R&D in the theoretical framework of Nash bargaining solution, the paper investigates bilateral incentive and bargaining of collaborative R&D with risk aversion.It analyzes impact of efficiency of R&D,risk aversion and fluctuation of collaborative R&D output on the optimal linear sharing proportion.The optimal linear sharing ratio of one firm increases (decreases) in efficiency of R&D of its own (the other firm), and decreases (increases)in the risk aversion degree of its own (the other party).Furthermore, the changing direction of optimal linear sharing ratio, with variance of collaborative R&D output varying, depends on whether the product of one firm`s risk aversion coefficient and efficiency of R&D is bigger than that of the other firm.Finally, it discusses influence mechanism how the exogenous parameters, such as bargaining powers and risk preference of the R&D firms, efficiency of R&D, and stochastic factors and so on, affect the incentive contract and the output of collaborative R&D. |
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| Keywords: | cooperative R&D bilateral incentive contract risk aversion Nash bargaining |
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