| 管理层持股、所有权性质与公司诉讼风险 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵康生,周萍,刘玉博.管理层持股、所有权性质与公司诉讼风险[J].软科学,2017(5):60-65. |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵康生 周萍 刘玉博 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 南昌航空大学 数学与信息科学院,南昌,330063;2. 江西财经大学 现代经济管理学院,南昌 330013;上海财经大学 国际工商管理学院,上海 200433;3. 上海财经大学 国际工商管理学院,上海,200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2015-326) |
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| 摘 要： | 基于公司治理理论,以2007~2014年中国非金融类上市公司为样本,从理论与实证角度分析了管理层持股对公司诉讼风险的影响.研究结果表明:(1)管理层持股比例越高,公司涉诉的可能性越低,涉诉的频度和严重性越低;(2)所有权性质对管理层持股与公司诉讼风险的关系起到调节作用,相对国有控股上市公司而言,民营控股上市公司管理层持股比例越高,公司诉讼风险越低.研究结论在我国上市公司推进股权激励计划的背景下有现实意义,为民营企业实施管理层股权激励机制,促进管理层与股东利益趋于一致,降低公司诉讼风险提供了经验证据.
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| 关 键 词： | 管理层持股 所有权性质 公司治理 公司诉讼风险 |
Managers' Shareholding,Ownership Property and Firm Litigation Risk |
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| ZHAO Kang-sheng,ZHOU Ping,LIU Yu-bo.Managers' Shareholding,Ownership Property and Firm Litigation Risk[J].Soft Science,2017(5):60-65. |
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| Authors: | ZHAO Kang-sheng ZHOU Ping LIU Yu-bo |
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| Abstract: | Drawing upon corporate governance theory, this paper investigates the effect of managers' shareholding on firm litigation risk from the data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2014.Results show that: the larger the proportion of managers' shareholding, the less likely is the focal firm to engage in lawsuits, and the lower frequency and the less severity of lawsuits;ownership property plays the moderating role in the relationship between managers' shareholding and firm litigation risk so that the negative effect of managers' shareholding on firm litigation risk is more significant for private enterprise compared to stated owned enterprise.It extends the knowledge about the governance effect of managers' shareholding and provides empirical evidence for promoting managers' incentive mechanism in private enterprises. |
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| Keywords: | managers' shareholding ownership property corporate governance firm litigation risk |
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