| 防止对称信息合谋的报酬契约研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈霞,段兴民.防止对称信息合谋的报酬契约研究[J].科研管理,2004,25(5):65-69. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈霞 段兴民 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学管理学院,陕西,西安,710049 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金 (7983 0 0 10 )重点资助，教育部十五社科项目(0 1JA63 0 0 3 4)资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 锦标制度容易导致合谋问题的发生，现有的防止合谋的非对称机制是以歧视作为区分代理人的标志。这与许多国家维护公平就业的做法相违背。本文在强调代理人能力差异的基础上，建立防止合谋的非对称机制。并证明当能力差异为公共信息时，合谋收益就可以据此公共信息进行分配，因此双方的能力差异并不足以使代理人之间产生严重的利益冲突并导致利益集团的崩溃，从而无法防止合谋的发生。
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| 关 键 词： | 锦标制度 合谋 非对称机制 对称信息 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-2995(2004)05-005-0065 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年11月1日 |
Research on compensation contract for collusion-proof in symmetric information |
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| Chen Xia,Duan Xing-min.Research on compensation contract for collusion-proof in symmetric information[J].Science Research Management,2004,25(5):65-69. |
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| Authors: | Chen Xia Duan Xing-min |
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| Abstract: | Rank-order tournaments likely lead to collusion, asymmetric mechanism of collusion-proof research is based on discrimination, which is against to the practice of equal employment. In the view of ability difference, this paper studies the asymmetric mechanism of collusion-proof, and proves that: when ability difference is symmetric information, collusion stake can be distributed on this common information, thus ability difference cannot result in server benefit conflict between agents to make the coalition clash, it is impossible to prevent collusion. |
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| Keywords: | rank-order tournament collusion asymmetric mechanism symmetric information |
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