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财政补贴、代理问题与企业技术创新——基于R&D投资异质性视角
引用本文:顾群,谷靖,吴宗耀.财政补贴、代理问题与企业技术创新——基于R&D投资异质性视角[J].软科学,2016(7):70-73.
作者姓名:顾群  谷靖  吴宗耀
作者单位:1. 天津财经大学 商学院,天津 300222; 财政部 财政科学研究所博士后流动站,北京 100142;2. 天津财经大学 商学院,天津,300222
基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目(15BJY010)
摘    要:利用深圳证券交易所2008~2013年上市高新技术企业的数据,基于第二类委托代理问题,研究政府财政补贴对创新投入与创新模式的影响。研究结果显示:财政补贴对高新技术企业的创新投入具有正向促进作用;财政补贴对创新模式的影响存在差异,即财政补贴对探索式创新有激励作用,而对开发式创新没有作用;控制权私有收益对财政补贴与创新投入之间有负向调节作用;控制权私有收益对财政补贴与探索式创新产生正向调节作用,而控制权私有收益对财政补贴与开发式创新之间的关系不起作用。

关 键 词:财政补贴  创新投入  创新模式  代理问题

Fiscal Subsidies,Agency Problem and Technological Innovation---Based on R & D Heterogeneity
Abstract:Taking listed Hi-tech Enterprises in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2013 as samples, this paper analyzes the impact of fiscal subsidy on enterprises’ technological innovation and innovation mode based on the 2 nd type agency prob-lem. Results show that, firstly, the fiscal subsidy has stimulating effect on Hi-tech Enterprises’ technological innovation. Secondly, fiscal subsidy has different impact on innovation mode. The fiscal subsidy has promoting effect to the exploratory innovation, but does not work for the exploitative innovation. Thirdly, private benefits of control negatively moderate the re-lationship between fiscal subsidy and technological innovation. In the end, Private benefits of control positively moderate the relationship between fiscal subsidy and exploratory innovation. However, private benefits of control does not play a role in the relationship between fiscal subsidy and exploitative innovation.
Keywords:fiscal subsidy  technological innovation  innovation mode  agency problem
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