| 模糊对象和模糊性的逻辑 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 奥拉夫·阿歇姆.模糊对象和模糊性的逻辑[J].中山大学学报论丛,2008,1(2). |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 奥拉夫·阿歇姆 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文最初写于2001年,旨在探究语言上的、概念上的与本体论中的模糊性问题.文章始于这样一个问题,即模糊性仅仅是一个词的特征,抑或它也是我们的概念的特征,甚或是实在的特征?其中主要的关注点在于模糊对象的问题和相关的模糊同一性的问题.本文首先论证,即便模糊概念总可以得到进一步澄清,每个概念工具也必定是模糊的.其次,本文认为,如果不仅仅是词语,而且这些词语所表达的概念也是模糊的,那么可以论证,对象也必定是模糊的.第三,那种认为模糊对象必定具有模糊的同一性的思路是一种误解.最后一点尤为重要,因为对于模糊对象的抵制部分就来自于下述观念,即这种对象是不可能的,因为它们不遵守逻辑的同一律.本文也论述了,通过放弃二值原则以使得模糊陈述具有真和假之间的某个值或根本就没有真值的办法,也无助于解决模糊性问题,而且恰恰会造成相反的情况,即妨碍我们找到问题的解决之道.本文表明,在为真和既不真又不假之间,难以清晰地划分界限,正如在模糊的情形下要在真和假之间划界一样困难.本文的方法是利用量化模态逻辑的框架和语义学来处理这些问题.基于哥德尔模式的模态逻辑系统T,本文提出了一种关于清晰性和模糊性的量化逻辑,其中利用清晰性算子来代替必然性算子.文章还进一步讨论了模糊性和概念工具的发展之间的关联.
|
Vague Objects and the Logic of Vagueness |
| |
| Olav Asheim.Vague Objects and the Logic of Vagueness[J].Supplement to the Journal of Sun Yatsen University,2008,1(2). |
| |
| Authors: | Olav Asheim |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper, originally written in 2001, is an inquiry into the problems of linguistic, conceptual, and ontological vagueness. It starts by raising the question whether vagueness is a feature of words alone, or whether it is a feature of our concepts as well, and maybe even a feature of reality. The main emphasis is on the problem of vague objects and the related issue of vague identity. It is argued, first, that every conceptual apparatus must be vague even though vague concept can always be made clearer. Second, granted that not only words but also the concepts expressed by them are vague, it is argued that objects must be vague too. Third, it is argued that thinking that vague objects must have a vague identity is a misunderstanding. This is an important point since the resistance to accept vague objects is partly rooted in the notion that such objects are impossible because they do not obey the logic of identity. It is also argued that giving up the principle of bivalence, letting vague statements have a truth value between true and false or no truth value at all, will not help solving the vagueness problems, but, on the contrary, will be a hindrance to finding a solution. It is shown that drawing the dividing line between clearly true and what is thought to be neither true nor false, is as difficult as drawing the line between true and false in vague cases in the first place. The approach of the paper is to use the framework and semantics of quantified modal logic to throw light on these questions. A quantified logic of clarity and vagueness is developed, based on the pattern of the Godelian system T of modal logic, a clarity operator replacing the necessity operator. The connection between vagueness and the development of a conceptual apparatus is also discussed. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
