| 经理管理防御下的经理更换与独立董事、监事监督效率 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 张海龙,李秉祥.经理管理防御下的经理更换与独立董事、监事监督效率[J].天水师范学院学报,2010,30(5):70-73. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 张海龙 李秉祥 |
| |
| 作者单位： | [1]天水师范学院经济与社会管理学院,甘肃天水741001 [2]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目，高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金，教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 以独立董事监督和监事监督为经理更换约束条件,引入经理管理防御并分析非单一监督主体模式下独立董事与监事的监督效率,结果表明：当不存在惩罚机制时,拥有信息量的多少是决定监督效率的高低判断标准;当存在惩罚机制时,独立董事和监事趋向做出一致的评价结果,而且信息优势和更少惩罚威胁两种优势集中在一方时,将提高监督效率.经理管理防御行为不仅降低了独立董事和监事获取信息的数量,而且对其福利水平产生影响,使信息优势和更小惩罚威胁优势产生更大的分离,从而可能降低监督效率.
|
| 关 键 词： | 经理管理防御 独立董事 监事 监督效率 |
Manager's Turnover under the Managerial Entrenchment and Supervision Efficiency of Outside Directors and Supervisor |
| |
| Zhang Hailong,Li Bingxiang.Manager's Turnover under the Managerial Entrenchment and Supervision Efficiency of Outside Directors and Supervisor[J].Journal of Tianshui Normal University,2010,30(5):70-73. |
| |
| Authors: | Zhang Hailong Li Bingxiang |
| |
| Institution: | 1.School of Economics and Management,Tianshui Normal University,Tianshui Gansu 741001,China;2.College of Economics and Management,Xi＇an University of Technology,Xi＇an Shaanxi 710054,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | This article analyzed supervision efficiency of outside directors and supervisor under the managerial entrenchment with manager＇s turnover by the supervision of outside directors and supervisor.The results showed that as follows： when there was no punishment mechanism,the number of information was the level of supervision efficiency;when there is punishment mechanism,outside directors and supervisors tend to make the same evaluation results,and supervision superiority and the threat of punishment were two advantages of less concentrated in the party,which would improve the monitoring efficiency.Managerial Entrenchment not only reduced the information of outside directors and supervisors obtaining but also level of their welfare,so that information superiority and advantages of smaller threat of punishment were derived than before,which might reduce the efficiency of supervision. |
| |
| Keywords: | managerial entrenchment outside directors supervisor efficiency of supervision |
| 本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
