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运动员兴奋剂行为的博弈分析
引用本文:韩开诚.运动员兴奋剂行为的博弈分析[J].首都体育学院学报,2005,17(5):8-10.
作者姓名:韩开诚
作者单位:郑州大学体育学院,河南,郑州,450044
摘    要:运用博弈论,分析了竞技体育中运动员兴奋剂策略选择的有关问题,指出:在单人博弈模型中,运动员的兴奋剂策略选择除了受信息收集程度的影响外,还会受运动员风险态度类型的影响;在“怕吃亏”心理的作用下,个体项目运动员之间博弈的结果是服用兴奋剂对自己是较好的策略;集体项目运动员的兴奋剂策略选择过程较复杂,但在严格的约束务件下,完全理性的运动员不会使用兴奋剂。

关 键 词:兴奋剂  博弈论  均衡
文章编号:1009-783X(2005)05-0008-03
收稿时间:2005-06-21
修稿时间:2005-06-21

An Analysis on Athletes' Behavior of Doping with the Game Theory
HAN Kai-cheng.An Analysis on Athletes'''' Behavior of Doping with the Game Theory[J].Journal of Capital College of Physical Education,2005,17(5):8-10.
Authors:HAN Kai-cheng
Institution:School of P. E. ,Zhengzhou University ,Zhengzhou 450044 ,China
Abstract:With the game theory,the author analyzes the relative issues regarding players' tactic selection of dope in athletic sports. It is found that in the single-game model, their selection can be influenced not only by the amount of information collected by athletes,but also by the type of attitude toward risk,that under the feeling of "fear to suffer a loss" ,they tend to believe it is a good strategy to dope during individual sport items,but their selection of doping may be complicated for athletes of collective items and under the strict control conditions, the athletes of collective items will not choose the strategy of doping.
Keywords:Doping  Game theory  Equilibrium
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