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有限参与人的斯坦克尔伯格寡头竞争模型求解
引用本文:宋小娟.有限参与人的斯坦克尔伯格寡头竞争模型求解[J].苏州市职业大学学报,2011,22(1):58-60.
作者姓名:宋小娟
作者单位:南京财经大学应用数学学院,江苏,南京,210046
摘    要:子博弈精炼纳什均衡是完全信息动态博弈的基本概念,就如同纳什均衡是完全信息静态博弈的地位一样.通过逆向归纳法给出3人斯坦克尔伯格寡头竞争模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡及均衡结果,并将其推广到有限参与人的斯坦克尔伯格寡头竞争模型.

关 键 词:完全信息动态博弈  逆向归纳法  子博弈精炼纳什均衡  斯坦克尔伯格寡头竞争

Solution of Model of Stackelberg Oligopoly Competition with Finite-players
SONG Xiao-juan.Solution of Model of Stackelberg Oligopoly Competition with Finite-players[J].Journal of Suzhou Vocational University,2011,22(1):58-60.
Authors:SONG Xiao-juan
Institution:SONG Xiao-juan (School of Applied Mathematics,Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing 210046,China)
Abstract:Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium which is the basic concept of complete information dynamic game,has the same position as Nash equilibrium in complete information static game.The paper proposes the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the result of Stackelberg oligopoly competition model with three players by using backward induction.It is also applied to the competition model with finite players.
Keywords:complete information dynamic game  backward induction  subgame perfect Nash equilibrium  Stackelberg oligopoly competition model  
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