| 考虑公平偏好和政府奖惩机制的港口成本分摊决策 |
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| 引用本文： | 王义玲,杨斌,陈煜婧.考虑公平偏好和政府奖惩机制的港口成本分摊决策[J].上海海事大学学报,2020,41(1):71-79. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王义玲 杨斌 陈煜婧 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海海事大学物流科学与工程研究院,上海201306;上海海事大学物流科学与工程研究院,上海201306;上海海事大学物流科学与工程研究院,上海201306 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(71471109)；上海市科学技术委员会科研计划（17DZ2280200） |
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| 摘 要： | 为探讨港口在绿色发展过程中的成本分摊问题,以单个港口企业和单个物流服务商构成的二级港口服务供应链为研究对象,基于绿色服务水平建立以港口企业为主导的成本分摊模型,得到最优的绿色服务单价和成本分摊比例。利用模型分析物流服务商具有公平偏好和政府采取奖惩措施对决策和利润的影响。结果表明:成本分摊比例和公平偏好程度的增加均使绿色服务水平、绿色服务单价、港口企业的利润由一开始的下降到趋于稳定状态,而对物流服务商利润的影响则相反。绿色服务水平、绿色服务单价、港口服务供应链的利润都随着奖惩力度的加大而增加。在港口绿色发展过程中可通过政府奖惩对成本分摊和公平偏好问题进行有效协调,以保障港口的绿色可持续发展。
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| 关 键 词： | 港口服务供应链 公平偏好 政府奖惩机制 绿色服务 成本分摊 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019/3/12 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2019/5/13 0:00:00 |
Port cost allocation decision considering fairness preference and government reward penalty mechanism |
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| WANG Yiling,YANG Bin,CHEN Yujing.Port cost allocation decision considering fairness preference and government reward penalty mechanism[J].Journal of Shanghai Maritime University,2020,41(1):71-79. |
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| Authors: | WANG Yiling YANG Bin CHEN Yujing |
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| Institution: | Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai Maritime University and Shanghai Maritime University |
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| Abstract: | In order to explore the cost allocation issue during the process of port green development,a two-stage port service supply chain consisting of a port enterprise and a logistics service provider is studied.Based on the green service level,the cost allocation model led by the port enterprise is established,and the optimal unit price of green service and the cost allocation ratio are acquired.The effects of the logistics service provider’s fairness preference and the government’s reward-penalty mechanism on decision-making and profit are analyzed by the model.The result shows that:as the cost allocation ratio and the fairness preference degree increase,the green service level,the green service unit price and the profit of the port enterprise first decrease and then keep stable,while the impact on the logistics service provider’s profit is opposite.The green service level,the green service unit price and the profit of the port service supply chain all increase with the increase of reward-penalty intensity.During the process of port green development,the cost allocation and the fairness preference can be effectively coordinated through government reward-penalty mechanism to ensure the green and sustainable development of ports. |
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| Keywords: | port service supply chain fairness preference government reward penalty mechanism green service cost allocation |
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