| 技术标准中专利挟持的反垄断规制 |
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| 引用本文： | 林欧.技术标准中专利挟持的反垄断规制[J].科技管理研究,2015(18). |
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| 作者姓名： | 林欧 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海政法学院经济法学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 专利挟持存在标准化前欺骗或不披露专利信息,标准化后索要许可费;标准化后不遵守FRAND规则,索要高额许可费;标准化后专利权人滥用专利禁止令等多种表现形式。美国和欧盟均是在滥用市场支配地位的框架下规制专利挟持行为,但两者存在高低不同的违法证明标准,同时和解制度在实践中得到广泛运用。我国对专利挟持的反垄断规制,应当在滥用市场支配地位的框架下,选择低违法证明标准,充分发挥和解制度的作用。
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| 关 键 词： | 技术标准 专利挟持 垄断 |
| 收稿时间： | 2014/9/2 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2014/9/2 0:00:00 |
Antitrust Regulation on Patent Holdup in Technical Standards |
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| Abstract: | Patent holdup is a typical behavior of technical standards monopoly. It can be divided into different forms: cheating or refusing to disclose patent information before standardization, asking for licensing fee after standardization; against FRAND rules and asking for high licensing fee after standardization; abusing patent injunction. In US and EU,it was regulated under the frame of abusing the dominant position, and there is different testification standard of guilt ,also the reconciliation system is widely used in practice. For Chinese antitrust regulation on patent holdup, we should chose the low testification standard of guilty under the frame of abusing the dominant position, and give full play to the reconciliation system. |
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| Keywords: | Technical Standards Patent Holdup Monopoly |
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