| 基于前景理论的重大工程多主体利益博弈与行为演化机理 |
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| 引用本文： | 何寿奎,梁功雯,蒙建波.基于前景理论的重大工程多主体利益博弈与行为演化机理[J].科技管理研究,2020,40(5):207-214. |
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| 作者姓名： | 何寿奎 梁功雯 蒙建波 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074;重庆市江北区发展和改革委员会,重庆400020 |
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| 基金项目： | 基金项目：重庆市自然科学基金项目“重大工程项目多元化投资组织利益冲突机理与治理机制研究”（CSTC2018jcyjAX0005）；重庆市社会科学规划一般项目““一带一路”公共产品供给机制与风险应对研究”（2017YBGL153）；重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究项目“绿色公路评价标准与推进机制研究”（18SKGH049）。 项目来源：重庆市江北区发展和改革委员会课题““十四五”江北区政府投资招标投标综合监管政策及机制研究”（19JDH-0167）。 |
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| 摘 要： | 研究重大工程项目中政府、社会资本与社会公众三个利益主体间的经济利益博弈及其行为分析。将前景理论引入三方演化博弈分析过程,构建出不完全信息对称有限理性假设下的感知收益矩阵。运用复制动态方程分析政府、社会资本、公众三方在利益驱动下的博弈策略选择机理。结合演化博弈结果的仿真数据分析,提出政府建立合理的激励与约束机制、增强奖惩力度、提高公众的参与意识,以促使各方在项目预期目标与最终目标上相符合。
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| 关 键 词： | 重大工程 前景理论 多主体利益 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019/11/23 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2019/12/14 0:00:00 |
The Evolution Mechanism of Multiple Subject Conflicts of Interest in Major Projects Based on Prospect Theory |
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| Abstract: | Major project construction has become the driving force of social and economic construction, but major projects involve many subjects, and the conflict of interest between the various subjects is more complicated and changeable. This paper studies the economic interest game between the three stakeholders of government, social capital and public in major engineering projects and analyzes its behavior. The foreground theory is introduced into the process of three-way evolutionary game analysis, and the perceptual benefit matrix under the incomplete information symmetry and bounded rationality assumption is constructed. The replication dynamic equation is used to analyze the game strategy choices driven by the interests of the government, social capital and the public. The simulation data analysis combined with the evolutionary game results proposes that the government establish a reasonable incentive and restraint mechanism, enhance the reward and punishment, and increase the public''s participation awareness, so as to promote the expectations of the parties in line with the final purpose. |
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