| 前景理论视角下新能源汽车推广政策三方演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 许杰,陈富坚.前景理论视角下新能源汽车推广政策三方演化博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2022(11):66-72. |
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| 作者姓名： | 许杰 陈富坚 |
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| 作者单位： | 浙江大学城乡规划设计研究院,桂林电子科技大学建筑与交通工程学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 为加快绿色交通发展与促进新能源汽车市场推广，引入前景理论与演化博弈论耦合，构建新能源汽车推广政策三方演化博弈模型，根据模型的复制动态方程分析政府、汽车企业、消费者的策略选择演化及其影响因素，并通过Matlab软件进行数值仿真实验。研究结果表明，政府、汽车企业及消费者的决策行为会受到另外两者的决策影响；现金补贴政策能够促进汽车企业及消费者选择新能源汽车，但补贴过低达不到预期效果；部分限制燃油汽车政策能够增加消费者使用燃油汽车感知成本，同时增加新基建的投入能够提高使用新能源汽车感知收益，有助于策略组合朝理想状态演化。
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| 关 键 词： | 新能源汽车 前景理论 演化博弈 决策行为分析 仿真分析 |
| 收稿时间： | 2021/12/2 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2022/2/22 0:00:00 |
Three Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of New Energy Vehicle Promotion Policy from The Perspective of Prospect Theory |
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| Abstract: | In order to speed up the development of green transportation and promote the promotion of new energy vehicle market, this paper introduces the prospect theory, coupling it with evolutionary game theory, and constructs the three-party evolutionary game model of new energy vehicle promotion policy. According to the replication dynamic equation of the model, this paper analyzed the evolution and influencing factors of the strategy choice among government, automobile enterprises and consumers, and conducted the numerical simulation experiment through MATLAB software. The results show that the decision-making behavior of the government, automobile enterprises and consumers will be affected by the other two; The cash subsidy policy can promote automobile enterprises and consumers to choose new energy vehicles, but the subsidy is too low to achieve the expected effect; part of the policy of restricting fuel vehicles can increase consumers'' perceived cost of using fuel vehicles, and increase the investment of new infrastructure can improve the perceived benefits of using new energy vehicles, which is conducive to the evolution of the model towards the ideal state. |
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