| 基于演化博弈的绿色建筑规模化发展激励与约束机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘佳,刘伊生,施颖.基于演化博弈的绿色建筑规模化发展激励与约束机制研究[J].科技管理研究,2016(4). |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘佳 刘伊生 施颖 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京,100044;2. 中国矿业大学 北京 管理学院,北京,100083 |
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| 摘 要： | 绿色建筑规模化发展是转变城市发展模式的根本途径,是地方政府与开发商群体不断演化博弈的结果。运用演化博弈理论构建有限理性条件下政府和开发商群体的支付函数,建立复制者动态方程,分析在初始策略及激励与约束调整后的演化稳定均衡。
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| 关 键 词： | 绿色建筑 规模化发展 激励与约束 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2015/10/30 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2016/1/23 0:00:00 |
Research on the Incentive and Restraint Mechanism of Large Scale Development of Green Building Based on Evolutionary Game Theory |
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| Abstract: | The scale development of the green building is the fundamental way to change the mode of urban development, and it is the result of the continuous evolution of the local government and the developer group.The paper uses the evolu-tionary game theory to construct the payment function of the government and the developer group under the limited rationali-ty condition,and establishes the dynamic equation.It analyzes the stability equilibrium of initial strategy stage and the mo-ment after the adjustment of the initial strategy. |
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| Keywords: | green building large scale development incentive and restraint mechanism evolutionary game |
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