| 风险投资家的代理风险表现与控制机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 谈毅.风险投资家的代理风险表现与控制机制[J].科研管理,2000,21(6):32-40. |
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| 作者姓名： | 谈毅 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学管理学院国际经济研究所,西安,710049 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金资助!项目批准号 :9913JY0 6 0 |
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| 摘 要： | 在非对称信息条件下，市场参与之间的关系称为委托－代理关系，这大量地表现在一切组织，一切合作活动中，存在于企业的每一个管理级上，当然也存在于风险投资基金的运作中，解决这些问题，投资就必须通过一套科学的契约安排，对风险投资家的行业进行监控，从而缩小投资和风险投资家两的目标距离，削弱代理人对委托人利益的侵害。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资家 委托代理 控制机制 代理风险 |
| 修稿时间： | 2000-05-29 |
On the Principal-agent relationship and Control Mechanism in Venture Capital Fund |
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| Tan Yi.On the Principal-agent relationship and Control Mechanism in Venture Capital Fund[J].Science Research Management,2000,21(6):32-40. |
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| Authors: | Tan Yi |
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| Abstract: | In asymmetric information situation, the relationships among the market participators are called the principal-agent relationship, which exits in each organization, each cooperative activity,every management level of enterprises,and also exits in the running process of venture capital fund. To solve these problems,the investors must monitor the behavior of venture capitalists through a set of scientific contract arrangement,in order to shorten the goal space between the investors and the venture capitalist and weaken the invasion of agents to the benefit of the principals. |
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| Keywords: | Venture Capitalist Principal-Agent Control Mechanism |
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