| 减排视角下企业的最优研发与补贴 |
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| 引用本文： | 宋之杰,孙其龙.减排视角下企业的最优研发与补贴[J].科研管理,2012,33(10):80-89. |
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| 作者姓名： | 宋之杰 孙其龙 |
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| 作者单位： | 燕山大学经济管理学院, 河北 秦皇岛 066004 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家软科学项目《装备制造业原始创新动力机制构建与建设路径研究》，河北软科学项目《河北省高新技术产业发展R＆D资源配置研究》 |
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| 摘 要： | 以博弈论为理论基础,构建了研发补贴与污染排放税收下的企业研发模型,研究了减排目标下企业的最优研发水平、最优研发补贴和最优污染排放税收。研究结果显示:适当的污染排放税收有利于企业研发投入和产量的提高;研发补贴不会对企业的研发投入产生"排挤效应",可以较大程度上提高企业研发投入的积极性;企业对环境的污染需控制在社会可接受收的范围内,否则,企业的生产活动会被政府停止。
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| 关 键 词： | 减排 溢出水平 研发补贴 博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2011-12-22 |
The optimal R&D investment and subsidy under the perspective of emission reduction |
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| Song Zhijie,Sun Qilong.The optimal R&D investment and subsidy under the perspective of emission reduction[J].Science Research Management,2012,33(10):80-89. |
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| Authors: | Song Zhijie Sun Qilong |
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| Institution: | Department of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China |
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| Abstract: | On the basis of game theory, an enterprise R&D model under conditions of R&D subsidy and pollution emission tax has been constructed. With the goal of emission reduction, optimal R&D level, optimal R&D subsidy, and optimal pollution emission tax for the enterprises are studied. The research results show that appropriate emission tax is of benefit to the improvement of the R&D investment and output of enterprises; the R&D subsidy is able to eliminate the effect of push aside and improve the R&D investment greatly. The environment pollution must be controlled in the scope of social acceptable; otherwise, the enterprise production activities will be ultimately stopped by the government. |
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| Keywords: | emission reduction spillover level R&D subsidy game |
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