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| 基于Stackelberg博弈的中国投资北极航道沿线港口开发策略 | |
| 引用本文： | 潘常虹,李振福,孙冬石.基于Stackelberg博弈的中国投资北极航道沿线港口开发策略[J].资源科学,2020,42(11):2106-2118. |
| 作者姓名： | 潘常虹 李振福 孙冬石 |
| 作者单位： | 1.大连东软信息学院, 大连 116023 2.大连海事大学, 大连 116026 |
| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(20YJC630127) |
| 摘 要： | 在冰上丝绸之路建设背景下,北极航道的利用对中国对外贸易重新布局具有重要意义。针对中俄共同开发北极航道的问题,研究中国如何利用资本优势投资沿线港口开发获得长期稳定收益。利用Stackelberg博弈理论建立了中俄双方独立的博弈模型和有其他投资国参与时的混合博弈模型,选择代表性港口、利用DEA进行评价,并整理数据进行实证研究,得出了如下结论：①港口运营成本是影响最终收益的关键要素,在投资时应通过智能化设备和信息平台等降低运行成本。当有多国参与投资时,中国应争取先手优势,或选择组建投资联盟,不能通过压缩收益的方式进行价格战;②投资的港口要保证港口建设水平与港口发展潜力保持匹配,港口的建设水平过高和过低都将影响投资收益,通过DEA有效性评评价,可以找到现有建设水平的不足,并进行针对性调整。对于受政治等因素无法进行设施调整的港口,不作为优先投资对象;③投资额在较低的水平增长时,反而会带来收益的下降,进行联合投资是解决该问题的有效手段。投资的港口的总规模影响收益,需要平衡港口升级难度和港口总规模,优先选择升级难度较低的大规模港口群,而不是选择升级难度大、现代化程度较高的单独港口进行投资。 |
| 关 键 词： | Stackelberg 博弈 Matlab仿真 北极航道 投资组合策略 DEA |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-05-08 |
| 修稿时间： | 2020-09-18 |
Strategy of China’s investment in Arctic Passage development based on Stackelberg game theory |
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| PAN Changhong,LI Zhenfu,SUN Dongshi.Strategy of China’s investment in Arctic Passage development based on Stackelberg game theory[J].Resources Science,2020,42(11):2106-2118. | |
| Authors: | PAN Changhong LI Zhenfu SUN Dongshi |
| Institution: | 1. College of Information and Business Management, Dalian Neusoft University of Informatica, Dalian 116023, China 2. College of Transportation Management Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China |
| Abstract: | In the context of the construction of the Silk Road on the Ice, the use of the Arctic Passage is of great significance for the development of China’s international trade. Considering China and Russia’s joint development of the Arctic Passage, this study examined how China can use its capital advantage to invest in port development along the route to obtain long-term stable returns. Using Stackelberg game theory, an independent game model between China and Russia and a mixed game model when other investment countries are involved were established. Representative ports were selected for evaluation using data envelopment analysis (DEA), and data were collected for empirical research. The following conclusions are drawn: (1) Port operating costs are a key factor that affect the final profit. When investing, it is necessary to reduce operating costs through intelligent equipment and information platforms. When multiple countries are involved in investment, China should strive for early-start advantages or choose to form an investment alliance instead of engaging in price wars by reducing returns; (2) Port investment strategy must ensure that port development level matches port development potentialport development level too high and too low both will affect the return on investment. Through the effectiveness evaluation of DEA, we can identify the shortcomings of the existing development level and make targeted adjustments. Ports that cannot be adjusted for facilities due to political reasons are not regarded as priority investment objects; (3) When the investment amount increases from a low level, it will bring a decline in income. Joint investment is an effective means to solve this problem. The total scale of investment ports affects returns. It is necessary to balance port upgrading difficulty and the total scale of ports. Priority should be given to large-scale port clusters with lower upgrading difficulty, rather than to individual ports that are difficult to upgrade and have a higher degree of modernization. |
| Keywords: | Stackelberg game Matlab simulation Arctic Passage portfolio strategy data envelopment analysis (DEA) |
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