| 政府调控下竞争性逆向供应链合作谈判 |
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| 引用本文： | 桂云苗,龚本刚,程幼明.政府调控下竞争性逆向供应链合作谈判[J].软科学,2012,26(11):63-66,84. |
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| 作者姓名： | 桂云苗 龚本刚 程幼明 |
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| 作者单位： | 安徽工程大学管理工程学院,安徽芜湖,241000 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目，安徽省高校省级自然科学重点项目，教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 建立了多个制造商与多个回收商组成的竞争性逆向供应链的三阶段博弈决策模型,构建制造商与回收商间不对称信息Nash合作谈判框架,在财政收支平衡基础上以社会福利最大化为目标,利用逆向归纳法求出合作谈判的最优均衡。最后通过算例分析发现,绿色税率的提高会降低制造商的讨价还价能力和提高回收商的讨价还价能力,但税率过高反而会降低回收商的利润。
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| 关 键 词： | 逆向供应链 政府调控 合作谈判 Nash博弈 |
Competitive Reverse Supply Chain Collaborative Negotiation under Government Regulation |
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| GUI Yun-miao
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GONG Ben-gang
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CHENG You-ming.Competitive Reverse Supply Chain Collaborative Negotiation under Government Regulation[J].Soft Science,2012,26(11):63-66,84. |
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| Authors: | GUI Yun-miao GONG Ben-gang CHENG You-ming |
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| Institution: | 1.College of Management Engineering,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000) |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies two-echelon reverse supply chain consisting of multi-manufacturer and multi-collector,which considered government levies green taxes on manufacturer and provides financial subsidies for collector.The asymmetrical Nash bargaining game agendas was constructed.Utilized the backward induction,the equilibrium solutions to cooperative agreements is provided under social welfare maximization and financial revenue and payment balance.A numerical experiment was presented to prove that green taxes can weaken manufacturer bargaining power and enhance collector bargaining power,and excess green taxes has counter-effect on collector profit. |
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| Keywords: | reverse supply chain government regulation collaborative negotiation Nash game |
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