| 知识密集型外包项目中顾客的知识资产剩余控制权转移策略研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 耿紫珍,刘新梅.知识密集型外包项目中顾客的知识资产剩余控制权转移策略研究[J].软科学,2009,23(12):35-38. |
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| 作者姓名： | 耿紫珍 刘新梅 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学,管理学院,西安,710049 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然基金资助项目，西安交通大学"985工程"项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 建立委托-代理模型,对知识密集型外包项目中基于知识资产剩余控制权的外包商创新激励和机会主义行为风险作了分析与讨论,分别指出信息对称与信息不对称下顾客适当的知识资产控制权转移策略。结果表明:与信息对称情形相比,信息不对称情形下,顾客的知识资产控制权转移策略会受到扭曲,顾客应该根据对外包商机会主义行为倾向的判断做出决策。
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| 关 键 词： | 知识资产 剩余控制权 创新激励 机会主义行为 委托-代理模型 |
Research on Control Right Transferring of Intellectual Assets Based on the Analysis of Innovation Incentive and Opportunism Risk of Outsourcing Service Provider |
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| GENG Zi-zhen,LIU Xin-mei.Research on Control Right Transferring of Intellectual Assets Based on the Analysis of Innovation Incentive and Opportunism Risk of Outsourcing Service Provider[J].Soft Science,2009,23(12):35-38. |
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| Authors: | GENG Zi-zhen LIU Xin-mei |
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| Abstract: | This paper constructs principal-agent model and studies proper intellectual assets transferring strategies of client with information symmetry and asymmetry based on analysis of innovation incentive and opportunism risk of outsourcing service provider.Results show that intellectual assets transferring strategies of client with information asymmetry would be distorted compared with the case under symmetric information.Client would judge about the opportunism behavior tendency of service provider when decision about residual control right transferring is made. |
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| Keywords: | intellectual assets residual control rights innovation incentive opportunism behavior principal-agent model |
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