| 对称信息下制造商契约设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 曲春歌,杨建奎.对称信息下制造商契约设计[J].商丘师范学院学报,2014(12):18-21. |
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| 作者姓名： | 曲春歌 杨建奎 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京邮电大学理学院,北京,100876 |
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| 摘 要： | 考虑由制造商和销售商组成的二级供应链，其中市场需求依赖于产品价格、销售商的努力水平、产品质量和市场随机因素，并且市场需求是产品价格的指数型函数。在信息对称时，比较两种情况下制造商的最优契约设计：存在“保留利润”时和双方进行Stackelberg博弈时，结果表明：存在“保留利润”时，制造商给予销售商的提成比例系数为零时制造商的利润最优，但此时销售商的利润为一常值：保留利润；双方进行Stackelberg博弈时，双方的利润都不断增加且明显高于前者的最优值点，最后得到结论：信息对称时制造商和销售商进行Stackelberg 时的模型明显优于含有“保留利润”时的模型。
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| 关 键 词： | 契约设计 信息对称 保留利润 Stackelberg博弈 |
Manufacturer's contract design under symmetry information |
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| QU Chunge,YANG Jiankui.Manufacturer's contract design under symmetry information[J].Journal of Shangqiu Teachers College,2014(12):18-21. |
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| Authors: | QU Chunge YANG Jiankui |
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| Institution: | (School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijng 100876,China) |
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| Abstract: | This article considers a two -echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer where market demand depends on the retail price, the seller＇s effort level, product quality and market random factors ,and the market demand is the exponential function of retail price.With symmetry information we compare the optimal contract design of the manufacturer under two conditions where the profit retention exits and both sides conduct Stackelberg game ,the result shows that, when the profit retention exits the margin of manufacturers is optimal when the commission ratio coefficient is zero which the manufacturer provides the retailer with,however,the margin of the retailer is profit retention;when both sides conduct Stackelberg game the margin of both sides is increasing and it is significantly greater than the optimal point of the former.Finally we get the conclusion：with symmetry information the model of Stackelberg game conducted by the manufacturer and the retailer is better than the model which contains profit retention. |
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| Keywords: | contract design symmetry information profit retention Stackelberg game |
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