| 适用范围与收费标准:律师风险代理收费的简明博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张放,邓韵.适用范围与收费标准:律师风险代理收费的简明博弈分析[J].阿坝师范高等专科学校学报,2005,22(4):55-57,62. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张放 邓韵 |
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| 作者单位： | 四川大学,法学院,四川,成都,610064 |
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| 摘 要： | 律师服务市场存在案件诉讼代理费何时支付以及支付多少的矛盾。对该问题建立一个完全信息静态博弈模型进行定量分析,可推导出其中存在的纯策略纳什均衡及双方可能作出的决策,找到风险代理收费方式产生的原因,并以此为据界定其适用范围与收费标准。
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| 关 键 词： | 律师风险代理收费 适用范围与收费标准 完全信息静态博弈模型 纯策略纳什均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-4142（2005）04-0055-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 09 20 2005 12:00AM |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-09-20 |
Applicable Limits and Charging Standards: A Game Analysis of the Charging System of Attorney's Risk Agency |
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| ZhANG Fang,DENG Yun.Applicable Limits and Charging Standards: A Game Analysis of the Charging System of Attorney''''s Risk Agency[J].Journal of Aba Teachers College,2005,22(4):55-57,62. |
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| Authors: | ZhANG Fang DENG Yun |
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| Institution: | School of Law of Sichuan University, Sichuan Chengdu 610064, China |
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| Abstract: | In attorney service market,there exist the conflicts concerning the payment of lawsuit agent commission.By setting up a static game model of perfect information and making a quantitative analysis,the Nash equilibrium of pure strategies between the party and the attorney agent and the possible decisions of both sides in this non-cooperative game can be deduced,and the cause of the charge for risk agency can be found.In the light of such deduction,the applicable limits and charging standards of the charging system of attorney's risk agency can be specified. |
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| Keywords: | charging system of attorney's risk agency applicable limits and charging standards static game model of perfect information Nash equilibrium of pure strategies |
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