Can incentives for parents and students change educational inputs? Experimental evidence from summer school |
| |
| Institution: | 1. University of California, Davis, School of Education, One Shields Ave., Davis, CA 95616, United States\n;2. School of Educational Studies, Claremont Graduate University, Harper Hall 205, 150 East Tenth St., Claremont, CA 91711, United States;3. RAND Corporation, 1776 Main St., Santa Monica, CA 90407, United States;4. RAND Corporation, 4570 Fifth Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, United States;1. School of Physics and Optoelectronic Engineering, Yangtze University, Jingzhou, People''s Republic of China;2. School of Mathematics and Information Science, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou, People''s Republic of China;1. Department of Economics, Hallym University, 1 Hallimdeahak-gil, Chuncheon-si, Gangwon-do, 24252 Korea;2. Department of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, 25-2, Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, 03063, Korea\n;1. Montana State University, 306 Linfield Hall, PO Box 172920 Bozeman, MT 59717, United States;2. Montana State University, 208A Linfield Hall, PO Box 172920 Bozeman, MT 59717, United States;3. Amazon Lending, 2201 Westlake Ave Suite 500 Seattle, WA 98121, United States;1. University of Turin (ESOMAS Dept.) and CERP-Collegio Carlo Alberto. Corso Unione Sovietica 218bis, Torino (TO) 10134, Italy;2. CERP-Collegio Carlo Alberto, Italy;3. University of Turin (ESOMAS Department) and Collegio Carlo Alberto, Italy |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether incentives for parents and students can increase educational inputs, in this case, specifically, attendance. We evaluate the impact of randomly-assigned incentives for improving attendance at the summer program of a large metropolitan school district. Students were assigned to one of three experimental conditions: (1) financial incentives for parents combined with non-financial incentives for students, (2) non-financial incentives for students (no incentives for parents), and (3) control. We find that the combination of the parent and student incentives increased the daily attendance rate by 9% and the likelihood of having perfect attendance by 63%. The student-only incentives had a smaller and statistically insignificant effect on attendance. We find little evidence that these incentives affected attendance rates or standardized test scores during the regular school year following the summer program, but we do find that they increased the likelihood of re-enrolling in the district. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
