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1.
ALISTAIR MILLER 《Journal of Philosophy of Education》2017,51(4):785-800
In this article, I argue that although the Aristotelian ideal of leading a virtuous life for its own sake is admirable, conventional Aristotelian and neo‐Aristotelian accounts of how it might be realised are empirically inadequate: Habituation is unlikely to produce ‘a love of virtue’, practical experience cannot then produce practical judgement or phronesis, and Aristotle's conception of a virtuous life excludes all but an idealised elite. Instead, I argue that two conceptually distinct aspects of moral development can be identified: the ‘Aristotelian’ and the ‘Humean’. In the former, the desire to lead a virtuous life for its own sake is produced through certain forms of challenging experience which, by disturbing and decentring the egoistic self, evoke a personal moral transformation. In the latter, the capacity to act well in specific social situations is the outcome of a process of socialisation, first in upbringing and later through initiation into the practices of adult life. Both aspects should be promoted in moral education for together they produce something akin to full virtue in the Aristotelian sense: Practical wisdom and practical judgement—or phronesis. Moreover, ‘the good life’ is best conceived as encompassing a variety of transcendent goods. To live a virtuous life for its own sake constitutes one good or form of human flourishing; but it is not the only one. 相似文献
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Wouter Sanderse 《Educational Action Research》2016,24(4):446-459
This article explores what it means for teachers to engage in and evaluate students’ character education, by examining the connections between action research and Aristotelian virtue ethics. These connections are explored in two ways. Firstly, the article examines what perspective action research has on how moral education, understood in an Aristotelian way, can be implemented and evaluated. While character education may be hot in educational theory, academic advances have not always reached teachers, heads of school, policy-makers and politicians. Secondly, a specifically Aristotelian approach to action research is explored that may help teachers to understand how action research about character education in schools can best be conducted. After a comparison of the three major action research paradigms, ‘Aristotelian action research’ is described as a kind of dialogical enquiry that contributes to the growth of teachers’ practical wisdom, which, in turn, has an effect on children’s character development. The article ends with suggestions as to how research about character education could be improved if we shift our attention from making character programmes more ‘effective’ to extending and refining teachers’ own practical wisdom and virtue. 相似文献
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A Situationist Lesson for Character Education: Re‐conceptualising the Inculcation of Virtues by Converting Local Virtues to More Global Ones 
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下载免费PDF全文 Yi‐Lin Chen 《Journal of Philosophy of Education》2015,49(3):399-417
Inspired by the debate about character between situationism and virtue ethics, I argue that John Doris's idea, ‘local trait’, offers a fresh insight into contemporary character education. Its positive variant, ‘local virtue’, signals an inescapable relay station of the gradual development of virtue, and serves as a promising point of departure for advanced growth. The idea of converting local virtues to more global ones is accordingly proposed to represent an empirically more realistic way of conceiving how to approach the ethical ideal of global virtues. It helps to direct our gaze to the great intermediate developmental stages of virtue, which mark out a whole spectrum of virtues of varying degrees that fall short of full virtue. This new notion works together with the traditional Aristotelian account to provide a full account of how to effectively undertake the age‐old educational business of the inculcation of virtues. 相似文献
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《Journal of moral education》2012,41(3):255-270
This paper takes as its starting point the Journal of Moral Education Special Issue (September, 2008, 37[3]) ‘Towards an integrated model of moral reasoning’. Although explicitly post‐Kohlbergian, the authors in this Special Issue do not, I argue, depart far enough from Kohlberg’s impoverished notion of the role of the affective in moral life—or when they do so depart, they incorporate emotions as mere intuitive thrusts in an essentially polarised two‐system view of the moral self. Prior to that complaint, I sketch an account of two contrasting self‐paradigms: a ‘dominant’ cognitive, anti‐realist (constructivist) paradigm and an ‘alternative’ realist and emotion‐based one. I explore the implications of the latter paradigm, which I endorse, for our understanding of the ‘emotional self’: a self imbued with and constituted by (potentially rationally grounded) emotions. I finally contrast that understanding with the one permeating the Special Issue and elicit some educational implications of the alternative paradigm. 相似文献
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The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle's explicit remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child's affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle's view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child's sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child's behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non‐cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman's primarily cognitive view. 相似文献
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Matt Ferkany 《Journal of moral education》2020,49(1):111-128
AbstractIn Aristotelian virtue theories, phronesis is foundational to being good, but to date accounts of how this particularly important virtue can emerge are sketchy. This article plumbs recent thinking in Aristotelian virtue ethics and developmental theorizing to explore how far its emergence can be understood developmentally, i.e., in terms of the growth in ordinary conditions of underlying psychological capacities, dispositions, and the like. The purpose is not to explicate Aristotle, nor to assimilate Aristotelian ideas to cognitive developmental moral theorizing, but to draw on both to build an independently plausible theory of practical intelligence and its development. It is argued that one fruitful direction attends to the psychology of virtues Aristotle associates with practical intelligence, including comprehension, understanding, sense, and cleverness, instead of Aristotle’s remarks distinguishing fully virtuous persons from the continent, incontinent and the many. 相似文献
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Randall Curren 《Journal of moral education》2016,45(4):516-526
This article examines some central aspects of Kristján Kristjánsson’s book, Aristotelian Character Education, beginning with the claim that contemporary virtue ethics provides methodological, ontological, epistemological, and moral foundations for Aristotelian character education. It considers three different formulations of what defines virtue ethics, and suggests that virtue ethical moral theory has steered character educators away from important aspects of Aristotle’s views on character education. It goes on to suggest a broadening of attention to psychology beyond personality and the psychological status of virtues, and it concludes with an examination of Kristjánsson’s understanding of phronesis. 相似文献
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《Journal of moral education》2012,41(1):18-23
Abstract The present study investigated the strategies that elementary school teachers employ when they help other people resolve moral dilemmas. Thirty‐six elementary school teachers were randomly assigned to one of three groups and administered the ‘Defining Issues Test’ (DIT). Teachers in Groups One and Two were instructed to respond to the DIT as if they were helping a ‘10‐year‐old child’ or a ‘40‐year‐old adult’ resolve a number of difficult moral problems. Teachers in Group Three were instructed to respond to the DIT with their own opinions concerning the resolution of the same moral problems. Results revealed that teachers made no differentiation between their own views as to the resolution of moral problems and the advice that they gave a 10‐year‐old child or a 40‐year‐old adult attempting to solve the same problems. The implications of these findings for moral education are discussed. 相似文献
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Matt A. Ferkany 《Educational theory》2019,69(4):403-419
Epistemologists have long worried that the willingness of open‐minded people to reconsider their beliefs in light of new evidence is both a condition of improving their beliefs and a risk factor for losing their grip on what they already know. In this article, Matt Ferkany introduces and attempts to resolve a moral variation of this puzzle: a willingness to engage people whose moral ideas are strange or repugnant (to us) looks like both a condition of broadening our moral horizons, and a risk factor for doing the wrong thing or becoming bad. Ferkany pursues a contractualist line of argument according to which such hazardous engagement is a virtue only when it matters to our interlocutors whether they can justify themselves to us on terms we can accept — for our sake or for the sake of their own virtue, not instrumentally or to get something out of us. When it does not so matter, openness can be unintelligent or gullible — in other words, not virtuous. 相似文献
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David Carr 《Educational theory》2014,64(1):1-14
While honesty is clearly a virtue of some educational as well as moral significance, its virtue‐ethical status is far from clear. In this essay, following some discussion of latter‐day virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, David Carr argues that honesty exhibits key features of both moral and epistemic virtue, and, more precisely, that honesty as a virtue might best be understood as the epistemic component of Aristotelian practical wisdom. In the wake of arguments to be found in Plato's Laws, as well as in those of more modern philosophers such as Jean‐Jacques Rousseau and Iris Murdoch, Carr then traces the main roots of moral dishonesty to various forms of vain and self‐delusive ego attachment. In this light, he argues in the final section of the essay that literature and the arts may provide a powerful educational antidote to such attachment. 相似文献
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Randall Curren 《Journal of moral education》2014,43(4):484-499
This article addresses a puzzle about moral learning concerning its social context and the potential for moral progress: Won’t the social context of moral learning shape moral perceptions, beliefs, and motivation in ways that will inevitably limit moral cognition, motivation, and progress? It addresses the relationships between habituation and moral reasoning in Aristotelian moral education, and assesses Julia Annas’s attempt to defend the possibility of moral progress within a virtue ethical framework. Focusing on the motivational core of the puzzle, the article argues that Self-determination Theory (SDT) provides resources for better understanding how moral progress is possible and how moral education can facilitate such progress. 相似文献
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德性伦理是一种关注个人道德认识和道德修养,立足于个人道德品质的提高,并以实现主体自我完善和自我发展为终极目标的道德。德性伦理要求校长成为德性领导,校长德性领导应注重在真正的"人的意义世界"中展开其领导行为;要慎用权力、以德服人,重视道德领导的价值;应成为学习型领导者,并自觉提升自身领导力。 相似文献
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ANDREAS ERIKSEN 《Journal of Philosophy of Education》2016,50(4):605-618
This article develops a eudaimonistic account of professional virtue. Using the case of teaching, the article argues that professional virtue requires that role holders care about the ends of their work. Care is understood in terms of an investment of the self. Virtuous role holders are invested in their practice in a way that makes professional excellence part of their own good. Failure to care about the ends of professional practice reveals a lack of appreciation of the value of professional work. This ‘investment view’ is contrasted with the currently popular ‘key goods view’, which claims that professional virtues require a profession‐specific teleological structure. Unlike ordinary virtues, which are governed by eudaimonia or human flourishing, professional virtues are allegedly derived from professional ends, like health or education. The article argues that this delivers an unconvincing criterion for determining the merits of character traits. 相似文献
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SANDRA LAUGIER 《Journal of Philosophy of Education》2021,55(1):263-281
Stanley Cavell was the first to account for the transformation of theory and criticism brought about by reflection on popular culture and its ‘ordinary’ objects, such as so‐called mainstream cinema. However, Cavell is less concerned with reversing artistic hierarchies than with the self‐transformation required by our encounters with new experiences, and with the moral education they provide. According to him the value of a culture lies not in its ‘great art’ but in its transformative capacity, the same capacity found in Emerson's ‘moral perfectionism’. This new accent on examining the educational value of films as public occurrences of ethical theorising points towards the analysis of linguistic and aesthetic expression in a larger corpus works of ‘popular culture’, hence to going beyond Cavell's focus on the classical Hollywood movie. 相似文献
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Attempts to find positive new directions for moral education now face a number of well‐recognized challenges, including those relating to the rise of commodification and the virtualization of experience. It is argued that there is now a need for innovative approaches that move beyond the traditional frameworks of critical thinking and ethical reasoning, and that encourage the development of moral dispositions and personal conscience. One crucial limitation of traditional approaches lies in their reliance on a monological interpretation of self‐reflection that emphasizes objective impressions of the self. It is proposed that only a dialogical model of self‐reflection that recognizes the presence of competing self‐impressions is fully consistent with the kinds of authentic self‐reflection and critical questioning that are required for the develc pment of moral conscience. The emerging dialogical model of the self is also compatible with an approach to moral conduct grounded in the idea of an ‘ethics without ethics’ in which dispositions to act for the good of the community become the focal goals. It is argued that the dialogical model of the self supports a dynamic view of selfhood and identity through which the subject is encouraged to recognize its own complexity and vulnerability, rather than external principles, as the basis for moral responsibility and action. In practical terms, the dialogical model supports the idea of engaging students in activities in which they are encouraged to monitor their own thoughts, feelings, and actions, rather than in activities which perpetuate objective, monological modes of self‐thematization. 相似文献
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This article argues that the dominant sustainable development approach fails to acknowledge the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of social and environmental issues, and that sustainability requires a ‘transformational’ approach, involving a fundamental change in how humans relate to each other and to nature. The authors propose that virtue ethics, grounded in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, provides a framework with which to tackle such a transformation; to redress the human-nature relationship and help foster a more ecological perspective; to facilitate a more holistic and integrative view of sustainability; and to explore questions of how to live and flourish within a more sustainable world. Beginning with an overview of virtue ethics and critique of current approaches in environmental virtue ethics, this article proposes a new virtue, ‘harmony with nature’, that addresses the interconnectedness of our relationship with nature. This is followed by a proposal for the re-visioning of human flourishing as being necessarily situated within nature. The article concludes with some of the implications of a virtue ethics approach to sustainability, and the new virtue, for both sustainability education and moral education. 相似文献
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Peter Woods 《牛津教育评论》2013,39(4):387-410
abstract New government policies have to be mediated through teachers. Research among some teachers in primary schools revealed a number of creative adaptations to the National Curriculum. Some were strongly ‘resisting’ some elements. Where conditions were favourable, this developed into ‘appropriation’. A powerful aid towards appropriation can be ‘resourcing‘—ways in which the teacher role can be enhanced. At times, the teacher's work might be ‘enriched’ by the National Curriculum. However, at other times, another teacher might be forced to ‘re‐route’, and retire from teaching. Running through all these modes of adaptation is the interconnecting theme of self‐determination. Four aspects of this—self‐defence, self‐reinforcement, self‐realisation and self‐renewal—are revealed in the adaptations. The changes have been cathartic for teachers’ sense of self, but some, at least, are emerging stronger than before, whether they are still teaching or not. 相似文献
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The aim of this article is to initiate discussion about the pursuit of self‐awareness—a concept embedded in recent policy—as an educational goal. The authors argue that complex theoretical questions need to be addressed if improvements in policy and practice relating to personal, social and emotional education are to ensue. Such questions relate to possible interpretations of ‘self‐awareness’, a term that may be linked to outdated theories, implying a ‘self’ to be discovered and the possibility that people can sustain a ‘sense of self’ across time and place. From this perspective, self‐awareness may seem overly individualistic, obscuring more pro‐social goals (e.g. empathy, compassion, citizenship). Drawing on sociological and social psychological literature, as well as data from an empirical study of identity construction, it is hoped to contribute to the provision of firm foundations for personal, social and emotional education through a stronger theoretical exposition of ‘self‐awareness’. The authors' reconceptualised version highlights the importance of an expanded and flexible story of self, which they view as an invaluable tool for learning, fostering an openness to change. 相似文献