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1.
Small-scale deceit: deception as a marker of two-, three-, and four-year-olds' early theories of mind 总被引：8，自引：1，他引：8
This research report summarizes the results of a study into the abilities of 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children to deceptively lead others into false beliefs, and is intended to help arbitrate a growing controversy as to when young persons first acquire some theory-like understanding of other minds. Utilizing a novel hide-and-seek board game as a context within which to observe children's spontaneous use of deceptive strategies, a total of 50 subjects between the ages of 2 1/2 and 5 were tested. In contrast to the competing findings of others, which are claimed to establish that children younger than approximately 4 suffer a cognitive deficit that wholly blocks them from the possibility of entertaining any sort of contrastive beliefs about beliefs, the results of this study show that even 2 1/2-year-olds are capable of already successfully employing a range of deceptive strategies that both trade upon an awareness of the possibility of false beliefs and presuppose some already operative theory of mind. 相似文献
2.
Young children's attribution of action to beliefs and desires 总被引：4，自引：0，他引：4
When and how children understand beliefs and desires is central to whether they are ever childhood realists and when they evidence a theory of mind. Adults typically construe human action as resulting from an actor's beliefs and desires, a mentalistic interpretation that represents a common and fundamental form of psychological explanation. We investigated children's ability to do likewise. In Experiment 1, 60 subjects were asked to explain why story characters performed simple actions, such as looking under a piano for a kitten. Both preschoolers and adults gave predominantly psychological explanations, attributing the actions to the actor's beliefs and desires. Even 3-year-olds attributed actions to beliefs and false beliefs, demonstrating an understanding of belief not evident in previous research. In Experiment 2, 24 3-year-olds were tested further on their understanding of false belief. They were given both false belief prediction and explanation tasks. Children performed well on explanation taks, attributing an anomalous action to the actor's false belief, even when they failed to predict correctly what action would follow from a false belief. We concluded that 3-year-olds and adults share a fundamentally similar construal of human action in terms of beliefs and desires, even false beliefs. 相似文献
3.
Joan Peskin 《Child development》1996,67(4):1735-1751
This study examined children's understanding of pretense and deception in folktales in which a villam deceives his victim by pretending to be someone else. In Experiment 1, the 3-year-olds distinguished the real from the pretend persona, but neither understood the victim's false belief nor predicted that the villain would perpetrate the unwelcome act. In Experiment 2, revealing the villainous action facilitated 3-year-olds' predictions of this action during a retelling of the stories, but did not improve subjects' understanding of the victim's false belief. In Experiment 3, although the tasks were further refined to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation, 3-year-olds again did not follow the deception. The results are discussed in relation to 3-year-olds' difficulties with deceptive appearances and their understanding of acting-as-if in pretense. 相似文献
4.
Fledgling Theories of Mind: Deception as a Marker of Three-Year-Olds' Understanding of False Belief 总被引：3，自引：1，他引：3
3 studies involving more than 70 3- and 4-year-olds were carried out in an effort to better secure an earlier but controversial set of findings interpreted as demonstrating that children younger than 4 already have a grasp of the possibility of false belief, and consequently deserve to be credited with some authentic if fledgling theory of mind. These studies, which relied on a measure of deceptive hiding rather than more familiar "unexpected change" procedures for indexing false belief understanding, all demonstrated that even the youngest of these subjects: (a) accurately anticipated the likely impact of their deceptive strategies on both the behaviors (Study 1) and beliefs (Study 3) of their opponents, and (b) were able to selectively employ these same methods of information management as a means of helping as well as hindering the efforts of others (Study 2). 相似文献
5.
Saying something "almost happened" indicates that one is considering a close counterfactual world. Previous evidence suggested that children start to consider these close counterfactuals at around 2 years of age (P. L. Harris, 1997), substantially earlier than they pass other tests of counterfactual thinking. However, this success appears to result from false positives. In Experiment 1 (N = 41), 3- and 4-year-olds could identify a character who almost completed an action when the comparison did not complete it. However, in Experiments 1 and 2 (N = 98), children performed poorly when the comparison character completed the action. In Experiment 3 (N = 28), 5- and 6-year-olds consistently passed the task, indicating that they made appropriate counterfactual interpretations of the "almost" statements. This understanding of close counterfactuals proved more difficult than standard counterfactuals. 相似文献
6.
2 experiments examined children's understanding of the distinction between real and apparent emotion. In Experiment 1, 6- and 10-year-old children listened to stories in which it would be appropriate for the story protagonist to feel either a positive or negative emotion but to hide that emotion. Subjects were asked to say both how the protagonist would look and how the protagonist would really feel, and to justify their claims. The results indicated that 6- and 10-year-olds alike could distinguish quite accurately between real and apparent emotion, although 10-year-olds were somewhat better at justifying this distinction. In Experiment 2, a slightly modified procedure was used to test 4- and 6-year-olds. Again, 6-year-olds demonstrated their grasp of the difference between real and apparent emotion, and even 4-year-olds showed a limited grasp of the distinction. The findings are discussed in relation to recent research concerning children's concept of mind, their grasp of the appearance-reality distinction, their ability to produce complex, embedded justifications, and their ideas about emotion. 相似文献
7.
Early understanding and production of graphic symbols 总被引：3，自引：0，他引：3
Callaghan TC 《Child development》1999,70(6):1314-1324
Young children's ability to understand and produce graphic symbols within an environment of social communication was investigated in two experiments. Children aged 2, 3, and 4 years produced graphic symbols of simple objects on their own, used them in a social communicative game, and responded to experimenter's symbols. In Experiment 1 (N = 48), 2-year-olds did not effectively produce symbols or use the experimenter's symbols in the choice task, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds improved their drawings following the game and performed above chance with the experimenter's symbols. Ability to produce an effective graphic symbol was correlated with success on a task that measured understanding of the experimenter's symbols, supporting the claim that children's ability to produce a graphic symbol rests on the understanding of the symbolic function of pictures. In Experiment 2, 32 children aged 3 and 4 years improved their third set of drawings when they received feedback that their drawings were not effective communications. The results suggest that production and understanding of graphic symbols can be facilitated by the same social factors that improve verbal symbolic abilities, thereby raising the question of domain specificity in symbolic development. 相似文献
8.
Martin J. Doherty Marina C. Wimmer Cornelia Gollek Charlotte Stone Elizabeth J. Robinson 《Child development》2021,92(1):205-221
Jigsaw puzzles are ubiquitous developmental toys in Western societies, used here to examine the development of metarepresentation. For jigsaw puzzles this entails understanding that individual pieces, when assembled, produce a picture. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds (N = 117) completed jigsaw puzzles that were normal, had no picture, or comprised noninterlocking rectangular pieces. Pictorial puzzle completion was associated with mental and graphical metarepresentational task performance. Guide pictures of completed pictorial puzzles were not useful. In Experiment 2, 3- to 4-year-olds (N = 52) completed a simplified task, to choose the correct final piece. Guide-use associated with age and specifically graphical metarepresentation performance. We conclude that the pragmatically natural measure of jigsaw puzzle completion ability demonstrates general and pictorial metarepresentational development at 4 years. 相似文献
9.
2 experiments examined children's understanding of the expression of speaker certainty and uncertainty and its relation to their developing theory of mind. In the first experiment, 80 children between 3 and 6 years of age were presented with a task in which they had to guess the location of an object hidden in 1 of 2 boxes. As clues to location, the children were presented with contrasting pairs of statements by 2 puppets. Different trials contained all of the possible pairwise combinations of either the modal verbs must, might, and could or the modal adjuncts probably, possibly, and maybe. Results showed that while 3-year-olds did not differentiate between any of the modal contrasts presented, 4-year-olds and older children were able to find the hidden object on the basis of what they heard. Performance was best for contrasts involving a highly certain term (either must or probably) paired with a less certain term (might, could, possibly, and maybe). Experiment 2 was designed to determine whether competence with modal terms was related to competence with mental terms in the same task, and whether performance on the certainty task was related to other aspects of the child's understanding of the nature of beliefs. 26 4-year-olds were presented with the certainty task, involving both modal and mental terms, and with tasks assessing their understanding of false beliefs, representational change, and the appearance-reality distinction. Results showed that all of these tasks were intercorrelated, implying that what may develop at 4 years of age may be a general understanding of the representational nature of belief. 相似文献
10.
11.
Research suggests that young children may see a direct and one-way connection between facts about the world and epistemic mental states (e.g., belief). Conventions represent instances of active constructions of the mind that change facts about the world. As such, a mature understanding of convention would seem to present a strong challenge to children's simplified notions of epistemic relations. Three experiments assessed young children's abilities to track behavioral, representational, and truth aspects of conventions. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-old children (N = 30) recognized that conventional stipulations would change people's behaviors. However, participants generally failed to understand how stipulations might affect representations. In Experiment 2, 3-, 5-, and 7-year-old children (N = 53) were asked to reason about the truth values of statements about pretenses and conventions. The two younger groups of children often confused the two types of states, whereas older children consistently judged that conventions, but not pretenses, changed reality. In Experiment 3, the same 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 42) participated in tasks assessing their understanding of representational diversity (e.g., false belief). In general, children's performance on false-belief and "false-convention" tasks did not differ, which suggests that conventions were understood as involving truth claims (as akin to beliefs about physical reality). Children's difficulties with the idea of conventional truth seems consistent with current accounts of developing theories of mind. 相似文献
12.
研究用2个心理理论范式测量错误信念认知和情绪理解能力,比较33名孤儿和33名非孤儿的表现,并分析了错误信念认知和情绪理解的关系。结果显示:(1)孤儿错误信念认知水平发展趋势与非孤儿一致,但孤儿的错误信念认知能力发展显著低于非孤儿;(2)孤儿的情绪理解发展趋势和水平与非孤儿基本一致;(3)儿童(包括孤儿)错误信念认知和情绪理解在3-5岁期间发生明显变化,大多数儿童在5岁时已基本具备错误信念认知和情绪理解的能力,4岁是儿童错误信念认知和情绪理解能力发展的重要年龄;(4)儿童错误信念认知与情绪理解关系密切。 相似文献
13.
Young Children's Understanding of Changes in Their Mental States 总被引：4，自引：1，他引：4
3-year-old children have difficulty reporting their past false beliefs. We investigated their ability to remember and report other types of past mental state, in particular, pretenses, images, perceptions, desires, and intentions. In a series of tasks, children were placed in one mental state, that state was changed, and they were asked to report the initial state. 4-year-olds were generally able to report all their past mental states, including beliefs. 3-year-olds were able to report past pretenses, images, and perceptions extremely well. They had great difficulty reporting past beliefs. Reporting past desires and intentions was more difficult than reporting pretenses, images, and perceptions, but slightly less difficult than reporting beliefs. The evidence suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty understanding the nature of representation. 相似文献
14.
A Comparison of Young Children's Understanding of Contradictory Representations in Pretense, Memory, and Belief 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
Wendy L. Custer 《Child development》1996,67(2):678-688
The present study examined the nature of young children's understanding of various mental representations. 3- and 4-year-olds were presented with story protagonists who held mental representations (beliefs, pretenses, and memories) that contradicted reality. Subjects chose 1 of 2 alternate " thought pictures " (depicting either the mental representation or reality) that reflected the mental state. While 4-year-olds performed relatively well on all scenario types, 3-year-olds chose the correct thought picture significantly more often for pretense and memory scenarios than for false belief scenarios. These results suggest that young children conceptualize pretense as involving mental representations, and that they have more difficulty understanding contradictory mental representations that purport to correspond to reality. 相似文献
15.
Although recent research indicates that an increased sensitivity to visual appearances develops around 4 or 5 years of age, evidence from perceptual studies suggests that certain types of appearances, that is, projective size and shape, are not noticed or understood until at least 7. 4 experiments investigated preschool children's knowledge of the projective size--distance and projective shape--orientation relationships. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were asked whether an object should be moved farther or nearer in order to increase or decrease its apparent size. 4-year-olds performed significantly better than chance, but 3-year-olds did not. Experiment 2 showed that 3-year-olds are able to perceive projective size changes, indicating that although they do not fully understand the projective size-distance relationship, the necessary perceptual information is potentially available to them. In Experiment 3, 3- and 4-year-olds were asked to indicate how a circular object should be rotated to make it appear either circular or elliptical. Again, 4-year-olds performed significantly better than chance, but 3-year-olds did not. Again also, the results of Experiment 4 indicate that although 3-year-olds are not aware of the projective shape-orientation relationship, they are capable of attending to changes in projective shape. Thus, the constraints on children's knowledge of the projective size-distance and projective shape-orientation relationships seem to be at least partly cognitive rather than wholly perceptual. These results are interpreted as further evidence for the acquisition of level 2 percept knowledge during early childhood. 相似文献
16.
Children's understanding of representational change and its relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance-reality distinction 总被引：16，自引：4，他引：16
This research concerns the development of children's understanding of representational change and its relation to other cognitive developments. Children were shown deceptive objects, and the true nature of the objects was then revealed. Children were then asked what they thought the object was when they first saw it, testing their understanding of representational change; what another child would think the object was, testing their understanding of false belief; and what the object looked like and really was, testing their understanding of the appearance-reality distinction. Most 3-year-olds answered the representational change question incorrectly. Most 5-year-olds did not make this error. Children's performance on the representational change question was poorer than their performance on the false-belief question. There were correlations between performance on all 3 tasks. Apparently children begin to be able to consider alternative representations of the same object at about age 4. 相似文献
17.
Recently, Chandler and Hala found that actively involving 3-year-olds in planning a deception facilitated performance on false-belief questions. The methodology used, however, provided no basis for determining whether the good performance of these young subjects was the result of the deceptive intent of their planning efforts, or whether other sorts of planning would have been equally effective. The research reported here systematically varied both ( a ) subjects' responsibility for planning where to relocate an object and ( b ) whether the goal behind this relocation was a deceptive one. The present research demonstrated, first, when subjects simply watched the transfer take place, it made no difference whether the object was moved for deceptive or some more practical reason. In contrast, those subjects who had themselves strategically planned a deception were markedly better at answering questions about another's false beliefs than those who simply witnessed the transfer taking place. No comparable facilitating effect was found when subjects planned a transfer but without deceptive intent. We argue that strategic planning works to underscore the importance of the belief states of others and provide opportunities not afforded by "standard" unexpected change or transfer tasks for showcasing 3-year-olds' emerging understanding of the possibility of false belief. 相似文献
18.
The present study investigated whether young children are gullible and readily deceived by another's lies. Specifically, this study examined whether young children believe a lie teller's statement when the statement violates their developing knowledge of a distinction between reality and fantasy. In the first three experiments 3- to 6-year-olds (N = 293) were presented with either a story or a live staged event in which an individual made an implausible statement about a misdeed (claiming that a ghost jumped out of a book and broke a glass). A significant age effect was obtained: 5- and 6-year-olds tended to report that the individual who made the implausible statement had actually committed the misdeed, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds tended to accept the claim of the protagonist. Experiment 4 revealed that 5- and 6-year-olds (N = 43) not only disbelieved an individual's implausible statement but also inferred that the individual was lying and had a deceptive intent. In contrast, Experiment 5 revealed that 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 41) had difficulty disbelieving an individual's implausible claim about an inanimate object (i.e., the claim that a chair came alive and broke the glass). The findings suggest that 5- and 6-year-olds are not so gullible as previously thought, and that they use their well-developed real-world knowledge to detect scapegoating lies. In contrast, many younger children tend to believe another's implausible lies, perhaps due to the fact that the knowledge needed to detect such lies has not yet been consolidated. 相似文献
19.
20.
Sobel DM 《Child development》2004,75(3):704-729
This study investigated 3- and 4-year-old's understanding of the relationship between pretense and mental awareness. In Experiments 1 and 2, only a subset of 4-year-olds recognized that sleeping characters and characters ignorant of their appearance were not pretending. However, these experiments had certain linguistic demands, which potentially influenced performance. In Experiments 3, these demand characteristics were reduced; under these circumstances, 3- and 4-year-olds recognized that pretenders were aware of their actions or appearance. However, Experiment 4 showed that even using this modified procedure, 3- and 4-year-olds do not completely understand the relationship between pretense and awareness. These data support the hypotheses that by the age of 4, children have some, but not a complete, understanding of the relationship between pretense and mental awareness. 相似文献