| 食品安全规制的重复博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘任重.食品安全规制的重复博弈分析[J].中国软科学,2011(9). |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘任重 |
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| 作者单位： | 哈尔滨商业大学金融学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150028;华东政法大学法学博士后流动站,上海201620 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究项目，黑龙江省自然科学基金项目，黑龙江省普通高等学校青年学术骨干支持计划，黑龙江省新世纪高等教育教学改革工程项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 以博弈论为分析工具,构建了政府与企业的静态博弈支付矩阵,通过引入罚金、公众满意度变量,解释了食品安全事件出现在一国经济快速增长时期的现象.通过考察企业间重复博弈机制,并引入奖励变量,改变了企业选择生产非安全食品的纳什均衡解,得出奖励与政府监管的搭配使用可以有效引导食品企业选择生产安全食品的策略.
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| 关 键 词： | 食品安全 罚金 公众满意度 奖励 重复博弈 |
Analysis on Food Safety Regulation Based on Repeated Game |
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| LIU Ren-zhong.Analysis on Food Safety Regulation Based on Repeated Game[J].China Soft Science,2011(9). |
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| Authors: | LIU Ren-zhong |
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| Institution: | LIU Ren-zhong1,2(1.School of Finance,Harbin University of Commerce,Harbin 150028,China,2.Postdoctoral Research Center of Law,East China University of Politics Science and Law,Shanghai 201620,China) |
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| Abstract: | The static game payoff matrix of the government and enterprises was built up using the game theory as the analysis tool.The phenomenon that many food safety incidents had been occured during the rapid growth period of a country's economy was explained by introducing the penalty and public satisfaction variables.The Nash equilibrium of the food enterprise'selection of producing unsafe food was changed through inspecting the repeated game mechanism and introducing the award system.We concluded that the combin... |
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| Keywords: | food safety penalty public satisfaction award repeated game |
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