首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

基于国际比较的港口与班轮公司纵向合谋反垄断罚金威慑研究
引用本文:李金,董岗.基于国际比较的港口与班轮公司纵向合谋反垄断罚金威慑研究[J].上海海事大学学报,2021,42(3):101-109.
作者姓名:李金  董岗
作者单位:上海海事大学,上海海事大学
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71774109)
摘    要:为阻止港口与班轮公司之间的纵向合谋行为,基于美国、欧盟和中国3种不同的反垄断罚金模式构建定量研究模型,并比较这3种模式下的罚金制度对港口与班轮公司之间纵向合谋行为的威慑作用。研究发现,港口与班轮公司的单位运营成本越高,合谋动机越大。与美国和欧盟的罚金模式相比,我国的罚金模式对纵向合谋的威慑力明显不足。以国内比较典型的某港口企业和某航运企业为例,在考虑港口与班轮公司纵向合谋违法程度的基础上,得到对港口与班轮公司纵向合谋行为的处罚应为没收违法所得,并处上一年度销售额60%以上罚款。

关 键 词:港口    班轮公司    纵向合谋    反垄断罚金    威慑性    国际比较
收稿时间:2020/6/11 0:00:00
修稿时间:2020/9/17 0:00:00

Research on deterrence of antitrust fine in vertical collusion of ports and liner companies based on international comparison
Li Jin and Dong Gang.Research on deterrence of antitrust fine in vertical collusion of ports and liner companies based on international comparison[J].Journal of Shanghai Maritime University,2021,42(3):101-109.
Authors:Li Jin and Dong Gang
Institution:Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai Maritime University
Abstract:In order to prevent vertical collusion between ports and liner companies, a quantitative research model is built based on three different modes of antitrust fine in the United States, European Union and China, and the deterrent effects of the three modes of fine on vertical collusion between ports and liner companies are compared. This study finds that, the higher the operation cost of ports and liner companies, the greater the incentive for collusion. Compared with fine modes of the United States and European Union, the fine mode of China is obviously not enough to deter vertical collusion. Taking a typical Chinese port enterprise and a typical Chinese shipping enterprise as an example, it can be obtained that the penalty for vertical collusion between the port and the liner company should be the confiscation of illegal gains and a fine of more than 60% of the sales of the previous year, on the basis of considering the illegal degree of vertical collusion between the port and the liner company.
Keywords:port  liner company  vertical collusion  antitrust fine  deterrence  international comparison
点击此处可从《上海海事大学学报》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《上海海事大学学报》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号